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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
 
 AN ACT. To express United States foreign policy with respect to, and to strengthen 
United States advocacy on behalf of individuals persecuted in foreign countries on 
account of religion; to authorize United States actions in response to violations of 
religious freedom in foreign countries; to establish an Ambassador at Large for 
International Religious Freedom within the Department of State, a Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, and a Special Adviser on International Religious 
Freedom within the National Security Council; and for other purposes (the incipit of 
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998). 
 
On October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed the International Religious 
Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) into law. As the process that lead to the founding of 
the law reveals, proponents of the IRFA conceived of the statute as a way to 
address what the Director of the Office of International Religious Freedom has 
termed “the U.S. religion avoidance syndrome” in American foreign policy (Farr 
2008: 47). Thus designed to address secularist tendencies, the IRFA obligates the 
President, his appointees as well as Congress to incorporate concerns for religious 
freedom in their development of American foreign policy. The IRFA thus 
institutes a new branch of foreign policy, which I refer to as (American) 
International Religious Freedom (IRF) policy. 
As such, the IRFA can be considered an American call for rectitude in the 
face of the global religious persecution. As we see in the above quoted incipit, the 
IRFA opposes the persecution of individuals “in foreign countries on account of 
religion” and authorises “United States actions in response to violations of 
religious freedom in foreign countries.” If these violations of religious freedom are 
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deemed to be of a particularly severe character, the IRFA calls for economic 
sanctions against the country in question. The IRFA thus not only strengthens 
United States advocacy on behalf of victims of religious persecution, it also 
authorises American unilateral economic sanctions. 
As a basis for the determination of IRF policy actions, the IRFA requires 
the annual issuing of a State Department Report on IRF. These reports catalogue 
religious persecution across the globe and divide countries into different 
categories according to types and degrees of discrimination. The annual State 
Department Reports also include an introduction written by the President 
appointed Ambassador at Large for IRF. In these introductions the Ambassadors 
sketch the motivation behind American IRF policy and thus provide a valuable 
insight into the American self-conception in relation to religious freedom. 
Moreover, if we further scrutinise the introductions to the State Department 
Reports, however, we can start to appreciate that there is more at stake for the 
United States than a simple response to injustice. Although these introductions are 
written for annual Reports that exclusively deal with foreign states, a striking 
feature is their emphasis on self-representation. As it happens, the introductions 
focus heavily on constructing the United States in the image of religious freedom 
as well as against violators of religious freedom, and in that way everything in the 
introductions become connected to the United States either by way of affirmation 
or exclusion. Curiously, this focus means that the United States emerges as the 
pivotal point in a discourse meant for the supposed empowerment of persecuted 
individuals and minorities across the globe. 
 
Motivation 
My interest in the IRFA began as I was researching religious persecution in the 
Middle East. Especially two things struck me as particularly interesting about this 
relatively new American law that I had stumbled upon: firstly, the law’s 
authorising function, and, secondly, its prominent attention to the construction of 
the United States as a paragon of religious freedom. What initially struck me as 
odd regarding the statute’s function “to authorize United States actions in response 
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to violations of religious freedom in foreign countries” was that a domestic law 
with foreign subjects should be authorised only domestically. Would the IRFA not 
need some kind of international authority in order to secure the global legitimacy 
of the foreign policy actions it sanctions? With no global authority could the IRFA 
not be perceived as a self-authorisation of American unilateral actions? Questions 
such as these led me to become interested in the problematics related to the IRF 
policy discourse’s attempt to establish the global legitimacy of the IRFA by 
situating it within the framework of international human rights texts. 
The second thing I found particularly interesting about the IRF policy 
discourse was the previously mentioned prominent attention given to the 
construction of the United States as the personification of religious freedom. For 
example, the IRFA includes a small historical narrative about the importance of 
religious freedom to the United States’ Founding Fathers, and the introductions to 
the annual State Department Reports continuously construct religious freedom as 
constitutive of the American tradition. The thing that struck me as particularly 
interesting was the fact that the IRF policy discourse constructs the United States 
as the diametrical opposite of that which it opposes: violations of religious 
freedom. This binary structure of identity/difference in the discourse made me 
think that perhaps more was at stake than simply reacting to the dictates of an 
independent and unjust world: it seemed to me that the discourse was actually 
constructing the world in such a way as to naturalise the political authority of the 
United States as a global judge on issues pertaining to religious freedom. These 
interests have led me to construct and work within the following problem field. 
 
Problem Field 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) marked the 
beginning of a revolution in interstate relations. By introducing the concept of 
inalienable human rights on the international state, the Declaration gave 
persecuted individuals and minorities across the globe an instrument for 
empowerment that transgressed the boundaries of the nation-state. At the same 
time, however, the UDHR not only empowered marginalised groups within states; 
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it also empowered powerful states to legitimately intervene beyond their territorial 
border in the name of human rights (Beck 2006: 143). The IRFA is an articulation 
of this empowerment of powerful states to intervene in foreign states on the 
grounds of human rights. It authorises American foreign policy actions in response 
to violations of religious freedom. Since these actions include economic 
interventions in the form of unilateral sanctions, we might observe a complicity 
between the IRFA and violence (economic coercion) in the sense that it attempts 
to abolish violence by acting violently itself” (Newman 2005: 106). This 
complicity between violence and law raises the important question of how to 
distinguish between the legitimate violence that enforces law and the illegitimate 
violence that threatens law and order, and points to a paradox in the human rights 
revolution: “the prosecution of states and groups who trample human rights under 
foot is just, but not the prosecution of groups and states who enforce human rights 
against others” (Beck 2006: 142). In order to fully investigate and grasp this 
problematic between legitimate and illegitimate violence, I have found it 
necessary to literally get to the bottom of law and interrogate the foundations on 
which its authority rests. Only then may we begin to understand the nature and 
consequence of the distinction legitimate/illegitimate. 
 The human rights discourse also has a moral-authoritarian aspect to it. It 
categorises the world in absolutes: you either violate human rights or you do not—
there are no grey areas (ibid: 141). The notion of human rights thus carries with it 
the possibility of becoming a discourse of domination when powerful states are 
constructed as “good” and weak states are constructed as “evil.” This structure 
may certainly be observed in the IRF policy discourse. The discourse divides the 
world according to the binary opposition of “religious freedom”/“violations of 
religious freedom” and emphasises the United States as the only country on a 
global level that unequivocally supports religious freedom. The IRF policy 
discourse thus establishes a positional superiority for the United States on two 
levels: 1) a legal level that grants the United States sovereign power on global 
issues pertaining to religious freedom, and 2) an ideological level that emphasises 
the United States as the model ideal against which other countries may be judged. 
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Problem Definition 
As may be gathered from the above problem field, the aim of this thesis is to 
problematise the IRF policy discourse as a justified human rights discourse by 
unmasking its hidden links to violence, sovereignty and domination. In order to do 
so, I ask the following question: 
 
What violence at the foundation of the IRF policy discourse compromises its 
authority, and how does the IRF policy discourse’s binary structure facilitate 
American domination in relation to religious freedom? 
 
Analytical Assumptions 
The above question is not asked out of nothing. It rests on certain assumptions that 
I will briefly name here and return to at depth further on in the thesis. The first 
part of the above question is based on the assumption that all institutions are 
founded on violence. I base this assumption of Derrida’s critique of authority, 
which I fully explain in chapter 2. The second part of the question is based on the 
assumption that all meaning is constituted through difference, and that there can 
be no declaration about the self that is totally free from the supposition of the 
other. I return to this notion in the section outlining Derrida’s thoughts on the 
binary structures governing signification in the below. 
 
The IRF Policy Discourse 
Throughout the thesis I refer to and analyse what I have decided to term “the IRF 
policy discourse.” I therefore include a small section explaining what I mean to 
signify with this term and what particular data it consists of. Perhaps obviously 
enough, I use the term “IRF policy” to signify that I am dealing with a particular 
branch of American foreign policy and thus not American foreign policy in 
general. My analytical interest is thus limited only to American foreign policy as it 
pertains to IRF. 
I use the concept “discourse” to refer to the structure and practice of 
language. By this I mean that discourses “comprise the rules that govern what can 
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be said (language as structure), as well as instances of what is said (language as 
practice) that can lead to changes in those rules” (Rowley & Weldes 2008: 190). 
However, discourse not only structures language practice. Drawing on Michel 
Foucault’s conception of discourse, I also regard discourse as the very structure in 
which the social world is constructed and controlled as an object of knowledge 
(Morton 2003: 85). In that sense, I view the study of discourse as inseparable from 
the study of institutional power and domination. By examining the IRF policy 
discourse, it becomes possible to understand the systematic way in which the 
United States is able to manage and produce the entire world in relation to 
religious freedom. My aim in analysing the IRF policy discourse is thus to show 
how the United States gains strength and identity by setting itself off against 
foreign states that violate religious freedom, thus creating a place of power that 
enables it to dominate the world on issues relating to religious freedom. My 
analytical approach to the IRF policy discourse thus focuses on how it constructs 
the world and the United States’ place in it. 
I construct the IRF policy discourse from primarily two sources: 1) the 
introductions to the annual State Department Reports on IRF and 2) the IRFA 
itself. The introductions to the State Department reports are interesting because 
they construct the official purpose(s) and necessity of American IRF policy. Each 
annual State Department Report includes a new introduction written for that 
particular year by the current Ambassador at Large for IRF. There are two main 
reasons why I have chosen to focus on the introductions to the State Department 
Reports: firstly, because they actively concern themselves with constructing 
American IRF policy as a legitimate human rights policy discourse grounded in 
international human rights standards. The introductions’ thoughts on human rights 
are invaluable to my deconstruction of the IRF policy discourse’s authority since 
they enable a comparative examination of the inconsistencies between the IRF 
policy discourse and international human rights standards. 
My other reason for choosing to work with the introductions to the State 
Department Reports is their immense attention to the construction of the United 
States as the personification of religious freedom. This emphasis on constructing 
the United States in the image of religious freedom in a discourse that opposes and 
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criminalises violations of religious freedom suggests to me that more is at work 
than simply reacting to a perceived reality of injustice. It suggests the ideological 
representational work of a powerful state to create and recreate the world in its 
own favour. This last point is reinforced and cemented by the IRFA, which I 
primarily use theoretically to draw attention to the conception of law as a power-
making practice that establishes sovereignty. 
 
Theory of Science: Poststructuralism 
My position in the field is starts from a poststructuralist perspective focusing on 
the way in which binary structures produce and organise our political reality. I am 
thus not so much interested in the actual implementation of IRF policy in foreign 
states as I am interested in the particular ways in which IRF policy, international 
relations and state identities are constituted in the IRF policy discourse. I am thus 
working within the epistemologically oriented theory of science. The consequence 
thereof is that my object of study is not presupposed (Andersen 1999: 14). Rather 
than observing the implementation of the IRFA as a series of intentional acts 
carried out by the pregiven subject, the American state, I have oriented my 
perspective to observing how the IRF foreign policy discourse constructs the 
world by drawing on the logic of binary oppositions. 
The IRF policy discourse perceives the world through certain perspectives, 
which make the world appear in a certain way (Andersen 1999: 14). My intention 
with the analysis is to examine the standpoint, or place of power, from which the IRF 
policy describes and creates the world. I do this with the aim of making problematic 
the IRF policy discourse’s claims to legitimacy and “normality.” I thus expose the 
violence and domination behind the IRF policy discourse and show its dependency on 
more or less arbitrary exclusionary practices for the maintenance of consistency 
(Newman 2005: 1). By drawing attention to the aporias in its representation of 
experiences as homogenous and stable phenomena, I am thus able to show that there 
is nothing inevitable or natural about the IRF policy discourse. 
It is with this understanding in mind that, instead of asking how the IRFA 
serves or is obstructed by American interests, I examine how the American IRF 
policy discourse, through the inscription of foreignness, helps produce and 
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reproduce the political identity of the United States as the dominant part in a legal 
framework structured by binary oppositions. 
 
Derrida’s Binary Hierarchies 
In my analysis of the IRF policy discourse, I have been particularly influenced by 
Derrida’s thoughts on signification—the process of meaning making—which are 
inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure’s argument that all meaning is relational (Hall 
1997: 234). Derrida argues that meaning is structured in terms of how signs differ 
from other signs and that being or knowing depend on a system of differences he 
terms binary oppositions. However, Derrida exceeds the thoughts of Saussure by 
emphasising that a final point of stable meaning is unreachable in any signifying 
system because meaning is always perpetually deferred in space and time (Morton 
2003: 25f). To Derrida, there is thus no such thing as a pure and self-contained 
identity; identity is always contaminated by what it excludes (Newman 2005: 98).1 
For Derrida, the idea of a complete identity is authoritarian in the sense that 
it establishes a series of hierarchical relationships in which one term is 
subordinated to another (Newman 2005: 85). Arguing that very few neutral binary 
oppositions exist, he notes: “[I]n a classical philosophical opposition we are not 
dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent 
hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), 
or has the upper hand” (Derrida 1981: 41). Binary structures, then, almost always 
express a power relation where the stronger pole of the binary dominates and 
includes the weaker within its field of operations (Hall 1997: 235). In that sense, 
binary structures form what Saul Newman (2005) has termed a “place of power” 
(Newman 2005: 86). Consequently, the binary structures organising the IRFA 
could be expressed “religious freedom”/ “violations of religious freedom” and 
the “United States”/“foreign states.” Moreover, as reflected in the United States’ 
self-positioning in the binary hierarchy, the identity constituted in the stronger 
                                                
1 Incidentally, this is the same thought governing Derrida’s deconstruction of the authority of law where he finds 
the legitimacy of law to be compromised by the excluded, illegitimate violence at its foundation. See chapter 2 for 
further detail. 
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pole typically also has the power to construct the identities constituted in the 
weaker pole (Rowley & Weldes 2008: 192). 
For Derrida, the point is to avoid or resist these hierarchies of absolute 
opposites, although he does recognise that “to deconstruct the opposition, first of 
all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. To overlook this phase of 
overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of opposition” 
(Derrida 1981: 41). He thus recognises the inversion of the hierarchies as the first 
stage of a deconstructive strategy because it shakes the hold of their underlying 
axioms and can lead to new ways that resist the formation of binary hierarchies 
(Stocker 2006: 124). However, to avoid the lure of authority that is inherent to all 
hierarchies, Derrida insists that one must go beyond both the inversion and 
subversion of hierarchies. Seeking to transform hierarchical structures rather than 
overthrow them, deconstruction thus employs a strategy of displacement, which 
questions and tries to make problematic the hierarchical structure, rather than 
simply reversing the binary opposition (Newman 2005: 87). 
 
The Structure of The Thesis 
In this section, I present each chapter of the thesis. Chapters 2 and 3 contain the 
main analysis. I present them by distinguishing the main argument each chapter 
brings forward after which I the theoretical basis on which I argue. In these 
sections, I thus also present and comment on the main literature that has 
influenced my working process. 
  
Chapter 1 This chapter is meant as an introduction to the IRFA. It focuses on 
two main issues: 1) the motivating factors driving the creation of the IRFA and 2) 
the law’s structure. The first three sections of the chapter examine the IRFA’s 
Christian origins, its attempt to influence executive power in American foreign 
policy, as well as the critique of the law as an instrument of the American 
Christian right. These three sections draw largely on Thomas F. Farr’s work World 
of Faith and Freedom: Why International Religious Liberty Is Vital to American 
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Security (2008). Farr has been employed in the Office of IRF2 since 1999. He 
started out as Deputy to Ambassador at Large for IRF Robert Seiple in June 1999 
but soon became Director of the Office of IRF. In this book, Farr criticises IRF 
policy for neglecting to promote religious freedom in favour of a focus on 
religious persecution reduction. Arguing for the indispensable value of religious 
freedom for American security, Farr suggests ways in which it may be more 
comprehensibly integrated in American foreign policy. Farr’s book has been 
invaluable to my introduction to the IRFA in virtue of its comprehensive detailing 
of the political processes leading to the founding of the IRFA as well as the past 
ten years of IRF policy making inside the State Department. I thus rely on it for 
informative value rather than its arguments for strengthening American IRF 
policy. The remaining four sections of chapter 1 examine the entities mandated by 
the IRFA, as well as its key terms and overall strategy. 
 
Chapter 2 In this chapter, I argue that the IRF policy discourse’s international 
legitimacy is compromised by its Americanised interpretation of international 
human rights. By imposing an unprecedented hierarchy in human rights in favour 
of religious freedom, the IRF policy discourse violates the authority of the UDHR 
and the United Nations General Assembly, which both call for a common 
understanding of human rights as equally important. In spite of contrary claims by 
IRF policy officials, the IRFA is thus not consistent with international human 
rights standards but a unilateral global venture in the name of a new, American 
conception of human rights that lacks the backing of the United Nations and other 
international organisations. 
The above argument is based on Derrida’s critique of institutional authority 
in his essay Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority (1992b). In this 
essay, Derrida problematises the legitimacy of the violence that law sanctions by 
exposing the foundations of all institutions as essentially violent, empty spaces 
resting on no anterior legitimacy. From this position, Derrida is able to deconstruct 
the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence, showing that the 
legitimate violence sanctioned by law is actually dependent on the illegitimate 
                                                
2 The Office of IRF is situated within the State Department. 
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violence at the foundation of law. Derrida’s deconstruction of authority is thus 
useful in the critique of any political discourse that claims to be grounded in and 
authorised by law because it exposes the instituting act of law as an act of self-
entitled power-making. 
In order to expose the violence at the foundation of the IRFA, I look to the 
IRF policy discourse for an answer to the question: what authorises the IRFA? 
Since the IRFA claims to be founded in the anterior legitimacy of international 
human rights, I quickly proceed to an interrogation of both the foundation of 
human rights as they are contained in the UDHR as well as the foundation of 
human rights as they are contained in the IRF policy discourse. I have chosen to 
focus on the UDHR as the primary source of human rights simply because it is the 
most referenced international human rights document in the IRF policy discourse. 
My aim in making a comparative interrogation of the foundations of human rights 
in the UDHR discourse and the IRF policy discourse respectively is to highlight 
the ways in which the IRF policy discourse differs from or, indeed, violates the 
UDHR’s understanding of human rights. Having thus shown the IRF policy 
discourse’s understanding of human rights to be an unprecedented reinterpretation 
of international human rights, I proceed to interrogate the foundation of this 
interpretation and link the unilateral violence I find at its base to the punitive 
sanctions authorised by the IRFA. 
 
Chapter 3 In this chapter I argue that the binary structure of “religious 
freedom”/“violations of religious freedom” organising the IRF policy discourse 
facilitates American global domination and colonialism. I detect this American 
positional superiority on at least two levels. Firstly, the United States positions 
itself as a global sovereign on religious freedom by instituting a law that 
encompasses all states while at the same time excluding itself from the reach of 
the law. I make this observation on the theoretical basis of Giorgio Agamben’s 
(1998) concept of sovereignty, which he defines as the capacity to be at the same 
time inside and outside of the law. The United States can thus be considered inside 
the law in virtue of its power to define and act upon violations of religious 
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freedom, but can at the same time be considered outside the law in the sense that it 
excludes itself from the field of the law’s operation. 
Secondly, I detect American positional superiority on a state identity level 
that is organised around the principle of identity versus difference. The IRF policy 
discourse partly constitutes the identity of the United States in the image of 
religious freedom by excluding and externalising violations of religious freedom 
and religious violence to foreign states. I base this part of the argument on 
Derrida’s theoretical notion of binary oppositions as violent hierarchies of 
signification in which the stronger pole almost always draws the weaker pole into 
its field of domination. Following Derrida’s notion that identity is both dependent 
on and threatened by the externalisation of difference for its constitution, I attempt 
to destabilise the binary hierarchy organising identity and difference in the IRF 
policy discourse by showing that the American identity is partly constituted by the 
religious violence it excludes and externalises to foreign states. 
Finally, I should note that David Campbell’s work Writing Security: United 
States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (1998) has been a considerable 
influence on this chapter’s analysis. His analysis of identity’s dependence on the 
externalisation of danger in American foreign policy compliments Derrida’s 
poststructuralist theoretical framework by adding to it the notion of a “temptation 
of otherness,” that is, the self/other mechanism through which identity emerges as 
a fictive paragon and regulative ideal by which the externalised “other” is judged 
(Campbell 1998: 131). Campbell’s thoughts have thus supplemented the 
theoretical basis on which I argue that the binary structure of the IRF policy 
discourses implies the mechanism of colonialism. 
 
Integrating English and Cultural Encounters 
Since this is an integrated thesis combining the two programmes English and 
Cultural Encounters, I have tried to distinguish which parts of the thesis might be 
constructed to fall under the aegis of which programme. I must emphasise, 
however, that I do not think a clear-cut distinction is possible, both because of the 
integrated nature of the thesis, but also because English and Cultural Encounters 
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share many approaches. I would thus argue that the entire thesis could fall under 
the aegis of both programmes. However, in the following, I try to briefly present 
each chapter of the thesis in relation to both the English programme and the 
Cultural Encounters programme. 
 
Chapter 1 As an introductory chapter to the IRFA that situates the law in its 
political context and presents the general structure of the law, I would argue this 
chapter falls under the aegis of either programme. However, if I had to impose a 
division, the religio-political contextualisation of the IRFA could fall under the 
English programme as an example of administration culture, whereas the 
examination of the structure and categories of the IRFA could perhaps fall under 
the Cultural Encounters programme. 
 
Chapter 2 In this chapter, I would argue that the parts of the analysis that 
examine the IRFA’s complicity with violence could fall under both programmes. 
The parts examining the problematics related to containing “universal” rights in 
law could be constructed to fall under the aegis of Cultural Encounters since these 
parts expose the cultural and political contingency of the human rights. However, I 
would also argue that the part of the analysis that examines the influence of the 
American rights tradition on the IRF policy discourse’s interpretation of human 
rights is just as relevant to the English programme. 
 
Chapter 3 I would argue this chapter falls under the aegis under both 
programmes. 
 
As a final note on the formalities relating to the integration two different 
programmes at Roskilde University, it should be emphasised that I have had to 
relate to two different study guidelines with likewise different formal 
requirements. This means that I have been forced to find a middle way between 
the requirements of each of the programmes’ study guidelines.  In terms of the 
length of the thesis, I have thus had to find a compromise between the maximum 
of 60+25% pages required at the English Department and the minimum-maximum 
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range of 80-100 pages required at Cultural Encounters Department. As a 
compromise, I have chosen to more or less meet the minimum requirement at 
Cultural Encounters, thus exceeding the maximum page limit at the English 
Department only slightly. In relation to the Danish summary, I have, likewise, had 
to find a compromise between the 450 words (1 page) required at the English 
Department and the 2-3 pages required at the Cultural Encounters Department. 
Again, I have opted for the middle way, restricting the summary to 2 pages. 
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1   The Creation and Structure of the IRFA 
 
 
 
 
A Christian Reaction to a Secular Bias in American Foreign Policy 
In the introduction to the 2000 State Department Report on IRF, the IRFA is 
described as “a textbook case of democratic activism” and the result of “grassroots 
democracy.”3 Individuals and organisations from Christian, Buddhist and Jewish 
communities are represented equally as the impetus behind the legislation. The 
IRFA is thus presented as the result of relatively diverse religious lobbying efforts. 
However, most scholars agree that the IRFA is primarily the effect of Christian, 
especially evangelical, lobbyism. As one scholar contends: “More than any other 
force, it was activism on the part of US Christians—overwhelmingly evangelical 
Christians—that put religious persecution on the agenda of the State Department 
and the Congress in the mid-1990s” (Castelli 2005: 321f). The powerful Jewish 
Washington lawyer Michael Horowitz was another central character in the early 
movement trying to turn the global persecution of Christians into a political 
cause.4 As we shall now see, the largely Christian impetus behind the movement 
that lead to the IRFA had a considerable effect on the composition of the bill that 
preceded the IRFA, the so-called “Wolf-Specter,” in the sense that it had an 
almost exclusive focus on Christian victims of persecution abroad. 
First, however, let us probe the question of why activists thought the 
persecution of Christians needed exceptional attention in American foreign policy. 
Religious freedom is not a new element in American foreign policy. In fact, the 
United States has reported on religious freedom since 1976 when the State 
Department started issuing Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 
Providing information on human rights on 194 countries and territories, these 
reports have an entire section devoted to religious freedom (Pastor 2005: 713). 
                                                
3 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2000: 1).  
4 Horowitz is also an activist at Washington’s Hudson institute. 
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Regardless of this place for religious freedom within the framework of the overall 
American human rights policy, the original supporters of the Wolf-Specter—
particularly the bill’s principal author, the aforementioned Horowitz—had a strong 
distrust of what they perceived as the State Department’s secularist disdain for 
religion, especially evangelical Christianity (Farr 2008: 116). In Horowitz’ mind, 
the State Department was deliberately ignoring the plight of Christians. 
The success of the activism and public focus on persecution is reflected 
already in 1996, when the International Operations and Human Rights 
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives conducted hearings about the 
global persecution of Christians and Jews. Following those hearings, Congress 
adopted resolutions on the persecution of Christians and Baha’is in Iran (Pastor 
2005: 715). In a climate of increasing concern for the persecution of Christians, 
such resolutions were, however, not deemed adequate enough. As a result of the 
strong distrust of the State Department, some members of Congress saw the need 
for a law requiring the United States to act (ibid.). The first bill to emanate from 
this climate was the “Freedom from Religious Persecution Act” of May 1997, 
which emerged out of a coalition led by Horowitz and Nina Shea.5 Horowitz 
drafted the bill, which became known as the “Wolf-Specter” after its two 
Republican sponsors Congressman Frank Wolf and Senator Arlen Specter (Farr 
2008: 113f).  
The concern for the persecution of Christians is reflected in several 
elements of the Wolf-Specter bill. Firstly, the bill’s supporters believed that 
immigration judges and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service were 
discriminating Christians who had fled their countries of origin on grounds of 
religious persecution by turning them away without a full hearing “because they 
were deemed to have failed the legal standard of establishing “a credible fear” of 
persecution” (Farr 2008: 122). In response to this perceived injustice, the Wolf-
Specter included a provision that amended the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
However, the immigration provisions turned out to be highly controversial. Not 
                                                
5 Nina Shea is a Roman Catholic and founder of Freedom House’s Center for Religious Freedom. She also wrote 
the book In the Lion’s Den: A Shocking Account of Persecution and Martyrdom of Christians Today and How We 
Should Respond (1997), which had a particularly widespread impact on the activism and advocacy of Christian 
organisations (Castelli 2005: 322). Shea was a U.S. Delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission between 1993-
2001; a member of the U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad from 1997 
until 1999, when she was appointed Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. 
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only was the evidence of bias against Christian applicants for asylum and refugee 
status largely anecdotal; critics also argued that the provisions heightened the 
status for victims of religious persecution, thus creating a hierarchy of human 
rights in which religious—and especially Christian—asylum seekers were 
favoured over victims of other human rights violations (ibid.). Therefore, the 
controversial immigration provisions did not make it into the IRFA. The IRFA 
only retained the more inconsequential provisions such as the required training of 
American immigration and consular officials on the subject of religious 
persecution (ibid: 126).6 
 
Indications of a Christian Bias and the Missionary Critique 
A Christian bias was also reflected in the Wolf-Specter’s definition of “persecuted 
communities,” which emphasised Christians to the apparent detriment of other 
persecuted minorities, most notably Muslims (Farr 2008: 115). Only two non-
Christian communities were mentioned in the bill, Tibetan Buddhists and Iranian 
Baha’is. Since these particular communities have some of the most effective 
lobbyists in Washington, Director of the Office of IRF, Thomas Farr, suggests that 
their inclusion in the bill reflected a kind of pork-barrel approach to identifying 
victim groups (ibid: 122). 7 The apparent Christian-centric approach to the 
legislation, however, attracted accusations of Christian crusading and imperialism 
from both domestic and international critics. To critics the Wolf-Specter was the 
work of the Christian right, which from their perspective meant that the bill sought 
to advance its narrow, sectarian intentions such as clearing the way for 
missionaries (Farr 2008: 115). 
Driven by a different vision of how the American government should 
address religious persecution, a group of congressional staffers led by John 
                                                
6 See Section 602 (“Reform of refugee policy”) and 603 (“Reform of asylum policy”) of the IRFA (1998) for 
further detail. 
7 Writes Farr: “No doubt many Wolf-Specter supporters included Tibetan Buddhists and Baha’is in the bill 
because of genuine concern for those groups. And, much to their credit, the lobbyists for the two groups are among 
the most effective in Washington, largely because they are credible. But the rationale for naming only those 
victims and excluding others proved weak and unsustainable. The Baha’is, whose beliefs require them to avoid 
any involvement in partisan politics (and who did not endorse any of the IRF bills), expressed their concern when 
approached about inclusion in Wolf-Specter but did no object. As one Baha’i representative put it to me, including 
the Baha’is in the bill was clearly understood as “an opportunity to include other groups so the [Wolf-Specter] 
won’t be seen as a Christian bill”” (Farr 2008: 333).  
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Hanford and consisting of Laura Bryant, William Inboden and Tom Delay 
produced the IRFA, which broadened the focus from the persecution of Christians 
to the persecution of all religious groups (Cozad 2005: 63; Farr 2008: 114). The 
bill was sponsored by Republican Senator Don Nickles and Democrat Senator 
Joseph Lieberman and introduced in the Senate in March 1998 before being 
passed and signed into law in October 1998. However, although this new law 
claimed to represent all persecuted religious minorities, the Christian-centric 
accusations directed at the Wolf-Specter were transposed to the IRFA (Farr 2008: 
122). Matthew L. Fore (2002), for example, notes that Arab and Muslim critics 
detected a distinct Christian bias in the rhetoric of the rallying campaigns in 
support of the IRFA: 
 
 Various conservative Christian groups such as the Southern Baptists, the National 
Association of Evangelicals, and the Family Research Council rallied to support 
IRFA initially because they were outraged that Christians were being denied the right 
to evangelize in other countries. Arab-American and American Muslim opposition to 
IRFA “was based on the concern that the bills were not part of a serious effort to 
provide balanced protections to the rights of religious minorities. Rather, they saw 
clear signs of ideological bias in the rhetoric of the legislation’s advocates” (Fore 
2002: 448). 
 
In her study of the imposition of the IRFA in India, Laurie Cozad (2005) likewise 
detects a Christian bias in the data collected in the Annual State Department 
Reports on IRF. She contends: 
 
 As such, at certain times and in certain contexts in the International Religious 
Freedom Act appears to privilege certain religious groups over others. This is clear as 
one looks at the language and the topical emphases of both the Commission and State 
Department Reports as well as public statements made by commissioners 
highlighting inconsistent policy decisions (Cozad 2005: 65). 
 
In the study, Cozad notes two particular ideological trends that function to 
privilege certain religious groups over others: firstly, an evangelical concern with 
the protection of Christians and their right to proselytize; and secondly, an 
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unwillingness to address the issue of Israeli treatment of Palestinians. The latter 
position she attributes to the political influence of both evangelical Christians and 
neoconservatives (Cozad 2005: 67). More generally, Cozad finds the language of 
the State Department and Commission Reports disproportionately concerned with 
the persecution of Christians as well as Christian missionaries (ibid.). With regards 
to the State Department Reports on India, she notes that the documentation of 
Christian persecution consistently outweighs the documentation of Muslim 
persecution in spite of the Muslim minority being considerably larger8 and the its 
persecution more severe.9 This disproportionate representation is attributed to a 
practice of passive data collection, a method that seriously compromises the 
validity of all the Reports’ evaluations of the status of religious freedom in each 
foreign country. Cozad quotes former director of research and deputy general 
counsel for the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 
Jeremy Gunn to support this theory. To Gunn, the disproportionate emphasis on 
Christian persecution is due to the effective lobbying of Christian groups: 
 
 Part of the reason for this is that [Christian] groups, they know about this act. They 
know a report is being issued, and they go and make noise about it. They will pick up 
the phone and tell the embassy and the embassy will record it. It’s not malice or lack 
of concern by the State Department, people writing the report will write what they 
know about (Gunn cited in Cozad 2005: 65). 
 
We thus see, that a Christian bias can be detected in the IRF policy discourse to 
this day. While this presents a general problem to the credibility of the IRFA, it 
also provides arguments for the critics who insist on perceiving the IRFA as an 
instrument in the Christian right’s mission to convert the world to Christianity. 
 
A Threat to Executive Power in American Foreign Policy 
As mentioned, distrust of the State Department drove many of the key decisions in 
the construction of the Wolf-Specter. One big problem the bill had to circumvent 
                                                
8 In India, Christians make up approximately 2.3% of the population, whereas Muslims make up approximately 
12% (Cozad 2005: 66). 
9 Cozad notes, for example, that in the three-year period 2002-2004, “more than 2,000 Muslims were killed as a 
result of communal violence, whereas the total number of Christian deaths did not exceed ten” (Cozad 2005: 66). 
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in order to secure the incorporation of religious freedom in American foreign 
policy is the President’s executive prerogative to act in the United States’ self-
interest in American foreign policy. A one scholar notes: 
 
 [T]he predominant pattern to have emerged over American history has been the rise 
of the Presidential office in the formulation of foreign policy and in the responsibility 
for American lives and interests abroad. This has been, and remains a controversial 
development in a system of government specifically designed to be one of limited 
powers and reciprocal restraints. But over the course of the republic, the presidency 
has been able to claim the existence of a synergy of development between the 
executive office and the policy sector of foreign policy. […] Foreign policy issues 
have been instrumental in the evolutionary transformation of American government 
into an extensive and centralized system of administration relating to the resources 
and actions of a world power (Foley 2008: 110). 
 
In order to circumvent this executive power in foreign policy, the Wolf-Specter 
and its immediate successor10 created an office of religious persecution 
monitoring, which was to be placed within the President’s executive office, rather 
than in the State Department. The director of the office, who was to be appointed 
by the President, would have the authority to impose punitive sanctions against 
countries in violation of religious freedom without any substantive input from the 
State Department or any direction from the President’s chief foreign policy 
official, the Secretary of State (Farr 2008: 117). The sanctions were to be 
automatic and based on a one-sanction-fits-all approach, and the only power the 
President would have over the Director was the authority to waive sanctions, but 
even then he was required to explain to Congress why a waiver was necessary to 
protect American national security (ibid.). As Thomas Farr has remarked: 
“Horowitz wrote his religious persecution bill to make punitive actions automatic 
and to bypass the State Department altogether” (ibid.). 
The Wolf-Specter’s threat to executive power in American foreign policy 
was a strong motive in both the Clinton administration and the State Department’s 
opposition to the bill (Farr 2008: 118). IRFA co-sponsor Republican senator Don 
                                                
10 The original Wolf-Specter bill was introduced in May 1997, but then amended and reintroduced in September 
1997 (Farr 2008: 117). 
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Nickles was also a prominent opponent of the Wolf-Specter, especially its 
provisions on mandatory punitive sanctions. His opinion—which was echoed by 
the State Department—was that the bill’s approach to punitive sanctions would 
not only be counterproductive in convincing foreign governments to support 
religious freedom; it would also, eventually, lead to repercussions against the very 
minority groups the bill was trying to protect.11 The Wolf-Specter also met strong 
opposition from American businesses and corporations that exported their 
products to countries potentially subject to sanctions. 
Although the revised version of the Wolf-Specter passed 375-41 in the 
House on May 14, 1998, it “was known to have little chance in the Senate” (Farr 
2008: 114). Realising this, Horowitz and his supporters transferred their hope to 
the new kid in Washington, the IRFA, which also sought to establish an agency 
outside the State Department, namely, the independent United States Commission 
on International Religious Freedom (ibid: 118). In the wake of the Wolf-Specter’s 
failure, Horowitz started lobbying vigorously for the Commission. His efforts 
helped secure its ample funding ($3 million per year), a nine-member staff 
completely independent of the State Department, as well as a mission reaching 
considerably beyond fact-finding (ibid: 120). Let us now turn to a brief 
examination of all entities established by the IRFA. 
 
Entities Mandated by the IRFA 
The IRFA established three new entities to investigate religious freedom around 
the world. Firstly, the law mandated the creation of an Office on International 
Religious Freedom within the State Department. According to the law, the office’s 
mission is to promote religious freedom as a core objective of American foreign 
policy. The office is headed by an Ambassador at Large for International 
Religious Freedom. The Ambassador is appointed by and must serve as principal 
adviser to the President on issues pertaining to religious freedom. The 
Ambassador is, furthermore, responsible for the State Department’s Annual 
Report on International Religious Freedom (IRFA 1998: Section 101). This report 
                                                
11 Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Don Nickles, Congressional Testimony, 12 May 
1998. Internet: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-28839918.html (19 Oct. 2009). 
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has two components: one describing the status of religious freedom in each 
foreign country and another detailing the United States’ actions and policies in 
support of religious freedom abroad. The State Department uses the report to 
identify “particularly severe” violators of religious freedom (IRFA 1998: Section 
102). The IRFA requires the report be submitted to Congress annually on 
September 1st (IRFA 1998: Section 101).  
The first Ambassador at Large was Robert Seiple, a Republican and 
evangelical Christian, who held the position for two years under Clinton’s 
presidency (1998-2000).  When Seiple’s successor John V. Hanford assumed his 
position in May 2002, the position had been vacant for nearly 20 months during 
which Seiple’s deputy Thomas F. Farr had run the office (Farr 2008: 163). 
Because the Office of International Religious Freedom had a hard time getting 
accepted within the State Department, Farr interprets the delayed appointment as 
an expression of the State Department’s long-established habit of resisting 
unwanted congressional mandates (ibid: 162). In the words of Farr, the function 
the Ambassador at Large represented was “simply not viewed as important enough 
to treat as significant to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, let alone to the 
protection of U.S. national security” (ibid: 163). 
The second entity mandated by the IRFA was a bipartisan Commission on 
International religious freedom to monitor religious persecution abroad and serve 
as a “watchdog” in relation to the State Department (Farr 2008:156). The 
Commission consists of nine members, three of which are appointed by the 
President while the six others are appointed by the two Houses of Congress. Its 
members are “not being paid as officers or employees of the United States” (IRFA 
1998: Section 201(b)(1)). The Commission’s functions are primarily monitorial, 
evaluative and advisory: it must monitor facts and circumstances in relation to 
violations of religious freedom in foreign countries and evaluate United States 
Government policies in response to such violations. Furthermore, the legislation 
requires that the Commission must “consider and recommend options for 
policies12 of the United States Government with respect to each foreign country 
                                                
12 The options for policies that the Commission may recommend include: “diplomatic inquiries, diplomatic protest, 
official public protest demarche of protest, condemnation within multilateral fora, delay or cancellation of cultural 
or scientific exchanges, delay or cancellation of working, official, or state visits, reduction of certain assistance 
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the government of which has engaged in or tolerated violations of religious 
freedom” (IRFA 1998: Section 202). Finally, the law requires that the commission 
“must submit a report to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress setting 
forth its recommendations for United States policy options based on its 
evaluations” (IRFA 1998: Section 203). 
Laurie Cozad (2005) notes a major problem stemming from the creation of 
two separate entities charged with the joint implementation of the IRFA. The 
division of labour between the Commission and the State Department office is far 
from clear-cut and IRFA offers no explicit description of each unit’s 
responsibilities. This lack of clarity in the division of labour and responsibility, 
Cozad argues, has allowed the Commissioners to set their own agenda in their 
reports and thus led to an exclusive focus on the few countries they have deemed 
the most severe violators of religious freedom. In doing so, the Commission has 
foregone its primary function as a critical assessor of State Department policies 
and reports on international religious freedom (Cozad 2005: 61). 
The third and final unit mandated by the IRFA is a Special Advisor on 
Religious Persecution for the National Security Council to “serve as a liaison with 
the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, the United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, Congress and, as advisable, 
religious nongovernmental organizations” (IRFA 1998: Section 301). 
 
Definition of Religious Freedom and Violations Thereof 
As Thomas Farr (2008) has noted that both the Wolf-Specter and the IRFA focus 
more on persecution and its reduction rather than the promotion of religious 
freedom. This negative focus is reflected in the IRFA’s third section entitled 
“Definitions” in which a definition of religious freedom is glaringly absent while 
both “violations of religious freedom”13 and “particularly severe violations of 
                                                                                                                                      
funds, termination of certain assistance funds, imposition of targeted trade sanctions, imposition of broad trade 
sanctions, and withdrawal of the chief of mission” (IRFA 1998: Section 202). 
13 The IRFA defines ‘violations of religious freedom’ as follows: 
 The term “violations of religious freedom” means violations of the internationally recognized right to 
freedom of religion and religious belief and practice, as set forth in the international instruments referred 
to in section 2(a)(2) and as described in section 2(a)(3), including violations such as— 
(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for— 
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religious freedom”14 are defined and distinguished from one another. Religious 
freedom is thus only defined negatively in the “Definitions” section, namely, in 
relation to how it may be violated. 
The only explicit definition of religious freedom can be found in the law’s 
second section entitled “Findings; policy” where the two virtually identical articles 
Article 18 of the UDHR15 and Article 18.116 of the ICCPR are cited under the third 
finding. The IRFA does not attempt to define religious freedom in its own terms, a 
circumstance that at least on the surface supports the IRF policy discourse’s claim 
to be grounded in the authority of international human rights instruments. 
The main difference between the two definitions of violations of religious 
freedom is their degree of intensity, the arbitrariness of the former as well as the 
“systematic, ongoing, egregious” nature of the more severe kind. It is, however, 
worth noting that in spite of the IRFA defining “particularly severe violations of 
religious freedom” as “egregious,” acts that may equally be considered egregious 
such as “torture,” “mutilation,” “rape,” “enslavement,” “murder,” and “execution” 
are also included as examples of simply “violations of religious freedom.” In that 
sense, one could accuse the boundary between the two categories of being 
somewhat unclear since their definitions make it possible to categorise 
“particularly severe violations” as simply “violations.” The IRFA delegates the 
                                                                                                                                      
(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, 
and prayer, including arbitrary registration requirements; 
(ii) speaking freely about one’s religious beliefs; 
(iii) changing one’s religious beliefs and affiliation; 
(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or 
(v) raising one’s children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s 
choice; or 
(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual’s religious belief or practice: 
detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced mass 
resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, 
enslavement, murder, and execution. (IRFA 1998: Section 3(13)). 
14 The IRFA defines ‘particularly severe violations of religious freedom’ as follows: 
 The term “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” means, systematic ongoing, egregious 
violations of religious freedom, including violations such as— 
(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
(B) prolonged detention without charges; 
(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or 
other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons (IRFA 1998: Section 
3(11)). 
15 Article 18 of UDHR reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.” 
16 Article 18.1 of the ICCPR reads: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching.”  
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power to decide which instances of religious persecution count as “particularly 
severe violations” and which do not, ultimately resides with the President. The 
IRFA requires that the President must designate a country a “Country of Particular 
Concern” (CPC), if he determines that it is engaged in “particular severe violations 
of religious freedom” (IRFA 1998: Section 402(a)(2)).17 Since a CPC designation, 
as we shall see in the following section, has policy consequences in terms of 
severity, the vague distinction between the two kinds of violations to some extent 
challenges the overall credibility of American IRF foreign policy. However, one 
could argue, that the independent Commission counterbalances this structural 
weakness in virtue of its function to evaluate government IRF foreign policy 
(including CPC designations) and recommend policies and countries eligible for 
CPC designation. In the past, the Commission has called out the United States 
Government for not designating its ally Saudi Arabia as CPC. As of today, the 
Commission faults the Government for not including the countries Iraq, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Vietnam on its CPC list.18  
Another critique that can be directed at the definition of the two kinds of 
violations of religious freedom in the IRFA is that it can be difficult to determine 
motivations in the discrimination of people. The definitions do not clearly define 
what constitutes violations of religious freedom, nor do they define how such 
violations can be distinguished from for example ethnic conflict and civil war. 
Moreover, one can also contest the need to separate the violations as specifically 
religious, since all of the violations described would also fall under the general hat 
of human rights violations. 
 
Presidential Actions in Response to Violations 
After determining which countries violate religious freedom and to what degree, 
the IRFA requires that the President must, in consultation with the secretary of 
state, the Ambassador at Large, the Commission and the National Security 
                                                
17 According to the section “Religious Freedom” on the United States Government website, however, the President 
has delegated the task of CPC designation to the Secretary of State. Internet: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/index.htm (19 Oct. 2009). 
18 The current list of the Commission’s CPC recommendations is available on the Commission’s website: 
http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1456&Itemid=59 (19 Oct. 2009). The 
State Department’s current list of CPC designations is available on the State Department’s website: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/c13281.htm (19 Oct. 2009). 
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Council Special Advisor, design a response to those countries. For this purpose, 
the IRFA lists fifteen enumerated Presidential actions.19 The Presidential actions 
range from a private demarche to a whole menu of sanctions (Presidential actions 
9-15). If a country is designated a CPC, the President has a 90-day deadline from 
the designation date to carry out “one or more of the Presidential actions described 
in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a)”. CPC designation thus triggers 
punishment in the form of some kind economic sanction. There are, however, two 
exceptions to this rule: an “Exception for ongoing Presidential action under this 
act” (IRFA 1998: Section 402 (c)(4)) and an “Exception for ongoing, multiple, 
broad-based sanctions in response to human rights violations” (IRFA 1999: 
Section 408 (c)(5)).20 Moreover, appropriate “commensurate action” is allowed if 
it furthers American religious freedom policy (IRFA 1998: Section 405(b)). 
Recognising that punishment may have adverse effect on engagement, the 
IRFA also includes a clause requiring that the President, in determining whether to 
sanction a country, seeks to minimize any adverse impact on the targeted 
country’s population as well as the humanitarian activities of American and 
foreign nongovernmental organisations in the country in question (IRFA 1998: 
Section 401(c)(2)). The IRFA does not, however, specify how such adverse 
                                                
19 The fifteen enumerated actions are (IRFA: Section 405(a)): 
1. A private demarche; 
2. An official public demarche; 
3. A public condemnation; 
4. A public condemnation within one ore more multilateral fora; 
5. The delay or cancellation of one or more scientific exchanges; 
6. The delay or cancellation of one or more cultural exchanges19;  
7. The denial of one or more working, official, or state visits; 
8. The delay or cancellation of one or more working, official, or state visits; 
9. The withdrawal, limitation or suspension of United States development assistance in accordance with 
section 116 of [the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961]; 
10. Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private investment Corporation, or 
the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of […] guarantees, insurance, extension 
of credit, or participation in the extension of credit […]; 
11. The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in accordance with section 
502B of [the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961]; 
12. Consistent with section 701 of [the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977], directing the United 
States executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against [specified] 
loans […]; 
13. Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any […] specific licenses, and 
not to grant any other specific authority […] to export any goods or technology to the specific foreign 
government […]; 
14. Prohibition [of] any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits totalling 
more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign government […]; 
15. Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring or entering into any contract for the 
procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government. 
20 Both of these exceptions have been quoted in accordance with the amendments in Section 2 “Technical 
corrections” of the Amendment of 1999 (U.S. Public Law 106-55). 
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impact may be minimized. This lack of specification weakens the IRFA’s 
emancipatory aim of protecting persecuted religious minorities by coercing 
foreign governments into respecting their rights. 
It should also be noted that actions (9)-(15) are not fixed responses. 
Reacting to the strong opposition against the automatic punitive sanctions 
suggested by the Wolf-Specter, the IRFA’s approach to sanctions allowed for 
flexibility. As Nickles explains in a Congressional testimony in May 1998: 
 
 We provide the President with a menu of options that makes it less likely that he will 
waive action and more likely that he will take action. We need to keep our eye on the 
goal. The goal of our bill is NOT to punish countries, but to change behavior, and if it 
is more likely that the President will take an action then it is more likely that behavior 
will change.21 
 
The Presidential waiver is secured in the IRFA’s Section 407 according to which 
the President may waive Presidential actions 9-15 or any commensurate action in 
substitution thereto on one of the three following conditions: 
 
 (1) the respective foreign government has ceased the violations giving rise to the 
Presidential action; 
 (2) the exercise of such waiver authority would further the purposes of this Act; or 
 (3) the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such 
waiver authority (IRFA 1998: Section 407). 
 
It is especially the third condition that Nickles sees as a threat to the effectiveness 
of the IRFA. The term “national interest” is flexible enough to make the argument 
for a Presidential waiver relatively easy. Nickles was so keen to minimise the 
chances of waived action, because he feared it could easily cause the State 
Department to appear both inconsistent and hypocritical in its international 
religious freedom policy if not all, especially severe, violators of religious freedom 
were punished.22 We thus see that the Presidential waiver carries with it the 
                                                
21 Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Don Nickles, Congressional Testimony, 12 May 
1998. Internet: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-28839918.html (19 Oct. 2009). 
22 ibid. 
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possibility of severe violations of religious freedom being overridden by 
unsubstantial category of “national interest.” 
 
A Twofold Strategy: Promote and Punish 
As mentioned, Thomas Farr (2008) notes that neither the Wolf-Specter bill nor the 
IRFA had the promotion of religious freedom as a major goal. In stead, both bills 
focused on identifying and reacting to governments engaging in religious 
persecution (Farr 2008: 114). This partiality for religious persecution over 
religious freedom is perhaps reflected in the previously mentioned absence of 
“religious freedom” in the statute’s list of definitions (IRFA 1988: Section 3). In 
spite of such alleged favouritism, the IRFA does not altogether dispose of the 
promotion of religious freedom. Rather, the statute defines American religious 
freedom policy as distinctly twofold: the United States must not only “oppose 
violations of religious freedom that are or have been engaged in or tolerated by the 
governments of foreign countries;” it must also “promote the right to freedom of 
religion in those countries through the actions described in subsection (b)” (IRFA 
1998: Section 401(a)(1)(A)). 
Title V of the IRFA is devoted to the promotion of religious freedom. In 
line with his criticism of the IRFA for focusing more on reducing persecution 
rather than promoting religious freedom, Farr, however, characterises Title V as a 
mere “rhetorical homage” to religious freedom, noting the title’s brevity as well as 
its equivocal and nonbinding language (Farr 2008: 114). The title’s ambiguous 
language is, for example, reflected in the formulation: “in the provision of foreign 
assistance, the United States should make a priority of promoting and developing 
legal protections and cultural respect for religious freedom” (IRFA 1998: Section 
501(a)(2)). While such formulations may sound promising, neither “legal 
protections” nor “cultural respect” are defined, which potentially weakens the 
implementation of the title. 
The central components of Title V are amendments to laws on foreign aid, 
international broadcasting, international exchanges, and foreign services to 
incorporate the promotion of religious freedom as a goal (IRFA 1998: Section 
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501-504). Similar provisions are made for American diplomatic missions abroad. 
According to Section 106 diplomatic missions should develop “a strategy to 
promote respect for the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion,” as 
well as “give particular consideration to those programs and candidates deemed to 
assist in the promotion of the right to religious freedom” in their allocation and 
recommendations for allocations of funds from the United States Government 
(IRFA 1998: Section 106). That diplomatic missions should “give particular 
consideration” to matters concerning religious freedom plays into the “hierarchy 
of human rights” criticism that accuses the IRFA of favouring religious freedom 
over other human rights and which is examined in depth in the subsequent chapter 
of this thesis. 
In this chapter I have attempted to give a general introduction to the IRFA 
by examining its origins and structure as well as some of the common criticisms 
that scholars have directed at it. In doing so, I have found that a Christian bias, 
alleged passive data collection, as well as unclear distinctions between the 
categories “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” and “violations of 
religious freedom” all present challenges to the credibility of the IRF policy 
discourse. The general introduction over, I now turn to the first step in my aim to 
unmask the IRF policy discourse’s relation to violence, sovereignty and 
domination: a deconstructive interrogation of the foundation of the IRFA’s 
authority and its relation to violence. 
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2   Authority and Violence in the IRFA 
 
 
 
 
Derrida’s Critique of Legal Authority 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main functions of the IRFA is “to 
authorize United States actions in response to violations of religious freedom in 
foreign countries.”23 As a first step to unmask the link between violence, law and 
sovereignty in the IRF policy discourse, this chapter starts out by deconstructing 
the political authority of the IRFA. In order to do so, I interrogate the IRF policy 
discourse’s answer to the question: what authorises the IRFA? First, however, it is 
necessary to become acquainted with the critique framing this chapter’s analytic 
inquiry: Derrida’s critique of authority. 
In Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority” (1992b), Derrida 
argues that the authority of is fundamentally ambiguous and open to question 
because the authority that grounds law is only legitimised after the law has been 
instituted. In other words, the authorisation of law is tautological; the law has 
authority because it is law. This means that the foundation of law, paradoxically, 
is non-legal. Says Derrida: 
 
 Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can’t 
by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence without 
ground. Which is not to say that they are in themselves unjust, in the sense of 
“illegal.” They are neither legal nor illegal in the founding moment (Derrida 1992b: 
14). 
 
The founding moment of law thus exists outside of the structure of law, or, 
phrased differently, does “not recognize existing law in the moment that it founds 
another” (Derrida 1992b: 40). Moreover, since it “could not itself have been 
                                                
23 Opening statement of the IRFA. 
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authorised by any anterior legitimacy” (ibid: 6), the founding moment is an 
illegitimate act of discursive violence. This is what Derrida means when he calls 
the position of the law “a violence without ground.” Moreover, since the founding 
moment of law exists outside of the structure of law, the identity of law is 
constituted by something it simultaneously excludes. The originary violence thus 
occupies a position of undecidability with regards to the law. It is at the same time 
inside and outside the law, and cannot be fully incorporated into it. This position 
of undecidability prevents the law from forming a closed, complete identity and 
makes the structure of law fundamentally aporetic (Newman 2005: 93). The 
structure of law is thus haunted by an irreconcilable internal disjunction, which 
makes the legitimacy of all laws and legal decisions fundamentally ambiguous. 
Derrida’s critique of authority is, consequently, useful in the interrogation of 
political and institutional discourses that claim to derive their authority from law. 
By interrogating the foundation of the IRFA, we may thus approach a critique of 
the authority sanctioned by this American foreign policy law. 
 
The Presupposed Legitimacy of International Human Rights 
In consulting the IRF policy discourse, it quickly becomes clear that the discourse 
claims to be authorised by an anterior legitimacy. As a federal statute with foreign 
subjects, the IRFA depends on the international human rights regime for 
legitimacy. The law cites and quotes several international human rights 
instruments and is, for the most part, cast in the language of human rights. The 
introductions to the State Department Reports on IRF consistently claim that, as 
the first Ambassador at Large Robert Seiple phrases it, the IRFA “draws on the 
internationally accepted belief in the inviolable dignity of the human person and of 
the universal rights that flow from that belief.”24 Moreover, we are told by IRFA 
co-writer William Inboden that the IRFA not only draws on but is meant to 
strengthen the international human rights regime: “IRFA seeks to strengthen, 
rather than undermine, international institutions such as the United Nations” 
(Inboden in Hackett, Silk & Hoover 2000: 14). The discourse thus also recognises 
                                                
24 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 1999). Pp. 2. 
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that the United States is acting within the context of an international human rights 
effort when it enforces the law. 
Does this reliance on an anterior legitimacy then mean that the IRFA is 
immune from a Derridean critique of authority? Derrida’s reply would be: no. 
“Even if the success of performatives that found law or right […] presupposes 
earlier conditions (for example in the national or international arena), the same 
“mystical” limit will reappear at the supposed origin of said conditions, and the 
origin of their dominant interpretation” (Derrida 1992b: 14). 
Since the presupposed anterior condition authorising the IRFA is the 
international human rights regime, it is thus the foundation and discursive limits of 
international human rights that must be questioned and challenged in a Derridean 
deconstruction of the IRFA’s authority. Moreover, since we are dealing with an 
American law that, in order to influence the realisation of religious freedom on the 
global stage, establishes a legal framework only for this right, what must also be 
interrogated is the limits and inconsistencies in the IRF policy discourse’s 
interpretation of international human rights. The two questions I ask to interrogate 
the authority sanctioned by the IRFA are thus: what are human rights founded on 
according to the IRF policy discourse, and how is this foundation 
deconstructable? and: what authorises the IRF policy discourse’s interpretation of 
international human rights and religious freedom? 
Since the IRF policy discourse’s interpretation of international human 
rights is based primarily on the UDHR, I start out by interrogating the foundations 
as well as discursive limits and assumptions of human rights as they are contained 
in the UDHR. 
 
The UDHR’s Doctrine of Inherence: Implied Natural Rights 
We may start out by noting that the UDHR is an outright secular document. The 
Declaration does not attempt to authorise human rights with references to 
theological or metaphysical natural laws. Metaphysical concepts such as “natural 
rights,” “human nature” and “God” are thus completely absent in the Declaration. 
Johannes Morsink’s (1999) comprehensive investigation of the drafting process 
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has also shown that the majority of the drafters of the UDHR were not interested 
in finding the alleged metaphysical foundations of the “inherent” rights listed in 
the Declaration. Rather, “they were content to just find them where the theists say 
God placed them, in the human person” (Morsink 1999: 294). The phrase “by 
nature” did appear in Article 1 for a while as a possible substitute for God in the 
sentence: “They are endowed [by nature] with reason and conscience […].” Even 
so, the phrase ended up being “deleted in a bargain to avoid a reference to God” 
(ibid: 284f). 
So what legitimises the UDHR, if not a metaphysical absolute? Although 
the UDHR does not explicitly reference nature, this to some analysts does not 
mean that its drafters saw no connection between human rights and human nature. 
Scholars such as Johannes Morsink (1999) and Mary Ann Glendon (2001) have 
still noted that the UDHR has an inescapable natural law connotation. This 
connotation is especially evident in the choice of words in the following two 
excerpts from the UDHR: 
 
 The first recital of the Preamble: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”  (UDHR 1948: Preamble). 
 Article 1: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood” (UDHR 1948: Article 1). 
 
Most scholars agree on the interpretation of human dignity as the universal norm 
that legitimises human rights in the UDHR. For example, one scholar notes: 
“Dignity of human beings is […] the source from which the validity and universal 
authority of human rights is derived” (Schwartländer quoted in Dicke 2002: 119). 
The UDHR, however, does not attempt to define human dignity. Dignity remains a 
supposed transcendent essence inherent in all human beings. Glendon argues that 
the UDHR’s view of dignity as “inherent” in all humans suggests that the UDHR 
traces its legitimacy not just in a universal norm, but a norm in human nature. Not 
only the “inherent dignity” suggests this foundation of rights in human nature, she 
also credits the notions that human beings are “born” free and equal in dignity and 
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rights as well as “endowed” with reason and conscience for having the same 
suggestive effect (Glendon 2001: 175). 
Morsink has argued along the same lines, noting that the UDHR contains 
words that indicate that people have rights “by virtue of their humanity and not 
from external causes, like acts of governments, courts, legislatures, or 
international assemblies” (Morsink 1999: 190). To Morsink, these indicative 
words are “inherent,” “inalienable” and “born”—all of which make up what he 
terms the “inherence view of human rights.” The inherence doctrine holds that 
dignity is “inherent” in all members of the human family because we are “born” 
with “equal and inalienable” rights. “Inalienable” means “unable to be taken away 
from or given away by the possessor.”25 The inherence view thus holds that since 
we are born with our rights, no person and no political or social body or organ 
could have given us these rights. At the same time, these persons or organs cannot 
take these rights away from us (ibid: 293). The doctrine of inherence thus points 
towards some sort of connection between nature and human rights while at the 
same time acknowledging the absence of notions such as “natural rights,”  “natural 
law” and “human nature” in the UDHR (ibid: 290). 
 
The Language of the UDHR: Roots and Discursive Assumptions 
What is clear, then, is that although it professes to universality, the UDHR is 
written in a certain language, the key concepts of which carry with them certain 
discursive assumptions about human nature, society and the human good that can 
be deconstructed. The UDHR has roots in Western Enlightenment philosophy thus 
exemplifies Derrida’s assertion that: “The law is neither manifold nor, as some 
believe, a universal generality. It is always an idiom” (Derrida 1992a: 210). Key 
concepts noted in the section above such as “dignity,” “inherent,” “inalienable” 
and the idea of being “born” into rights are all Enlightenment terms (Dicke 2002: 
113; Morsink 1999: 293). For example, the first sentence in Article 1: “All 
humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” reminds us of Rousseau’s 
Social Contract of 1762, which opens with the sentence: “Man is born free, yet 
                                                
25 New Oxford American Dictionary (second edition 2005). 
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everywhere he is in chains.” Article 1’s first sentence is, moreover, moulded after 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, which 
states that: “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights” (Morsink 1999: 
290f). The language of the UDHR is thus clearly rooted in the Enlightenment 
rights tradition, which as we saw in the previous section is reflected in its implied 
foundation of human rights in the concept of (human) nature. 
Another example of the influence of language on the discursive 
assumptions and exclusions in the UDHR is the articulation of the term “rights” 
itself. Human rights are expressed as “rights” rather than as “wrongs.” For 
example, the human rights discourse expresses the norm “it is wrong to kill me” 
by saying “I have a right to life.” This choice carries with it subtle implications of 
meaning. First of all, it shows that the human rights discourse’s perception of the 
norm is clearly subjective. The fact that it is possible to talk about “your” rights 
and “my” rights indicate a certain ownership—that humans have rights in their 
possession. This further implies that we have an active role in enforcing our rights 
and consequently also have the power to waive them. Some scholars attribute this 
waiver to the reason Locke articulated rights as “inalienable” (Taylor 1999: 127). 
Rights needed to be conceived of as “inalienable” in order to prevent governments 
from persuading its citizens to “freely” give up their rights. 
The subjective humanism that the notion of human rights is based on also 
stresses the incomparable importance of the human agent to the exclusion of any 
other non-human subject. The notion that the human has a higher status and 
dignity than anything else in cosmos has roots in Christianity and certain strands 
of ancient thought. The perspective centres everything on the individual, thus 
making his self-control and freedom of utmost importance. In that sense, the 
defence of “human rights” is inextricably linked to this exaltation of human 
agency in the Western mind (Taylor 1999: 135f). Moreover, subjective 
humanism’s emphasis on the individual’s freedom and right to consent to the 
political arrangements under which he lives also ties human rights to Western 
democratic traditions (ibid: 128). We thus see that the underlying philosophy of 
human rights both gives primacy to the individual and is tied to a specific form of 
government. 
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The Marginal Areas in Human Rights 
The point of insisting on the contextual embeddedness of human rights is not to 
dismiss the concept of “rights” altogether. On the contrary, Derrida insists on the 
ongoing and universal importance of human rights as a standpoint from which the 
sovereign state can be challenged: “We must [il faut] more than ever stand on the 
side of human rights. We need [il faut] human rights” (Derrida quoted in Newman 
2005: 97). To Derrida, however, this is not just a question of affirming the same 
set of “original” human rights. Rather, the ontological foundations of rights must 
be constantly challenged, questioned and rethought. Only by leaving the discourse 
of human rights structurally open, may it be further strengthened by the inclusion 
of its “marginal areas:” 
 
 Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot 
attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not 
without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities. But beyond these 
identified territories of juridico-politicization on the grand geo-political scale, beyond 
all self-serving interpretations, beyond all determined and particular reappropriations 
of international law, other areas must constantly open up that at first can seem like 
secondary or marginal areas. This marginality also signifies that a violence, indeed a 
terrorism and other forms of hostage-taking are at work (the examples closest to us 
would be in the areas of laws on the teaching and practice of languages, the 
legitimization of canons, the military use of scientific research, abortion, euthanasia, 
problems of organ transplant, extra-uterine conception, bio-engineering, medical 
experimentation, the social treatment of AIDS, the macro- or micro-politics of drugs, 
the homeless, and so on, without forgetting, of course, the treatment of what we call 
animal life, animality. […]) (Derrida 1992b: 28). 
 
Before 1945 when the term “human rights” became predominant instead of “rights 
of man,” women and sexual and ethnic minorities embodied such marginal areas 
(ibid.). And if we go even further back, we may note that the rights guaranteed in 
the Magna Carta of 1215 were not even rights of men as such, but special rights or 
privileges to be enjoyed by specific persons with specific belongings such as 
 42 
peers, feudal lords, and the clergy. Individual rights that were abstracted from 
specific belongings only emerged after the formation of sovereign states dissolved 
corps intermédiares (Yasuaki 1999: 110). 
 The history of human rights thus shows rights as evolving matter, rather 
than static, essential truth. In looking to the future, Derrida particularly emphasises 
animals, noting that an inclusion of norms for the treatment of animals in our 
emancipatory rights discourse would demand a total reconsideration of “the 
metaphysico-anthropocentric axiomatic that dominates, in the West, the thought of 
just and unjust” (Derrida 1992b: 19). One way of getting around this could be 
looking the expression of human rights norms in other cultures with different 
conceptual languages. This has been done by Charles Taylor (1999), for example, 
who emphasises Buddhism in Thailand as an alternative way to arrive at human 
rights norms. Instead of founding human rights in the dignity of the human person, 
Thai Buddhists ground their human rights outlook in the doctrine of non-violence. 
Since this doctrine entails a non-predatory stance towards the environment in its 
entirety, it leaves the discourse of non-violence structurally open to the inclusion 
of, for example, animal and even plant life (Taylor 1999: 134f). 
 Another marginal area or limit concept of human rights is the refugee 
fleeing persecution (political, ethnic or religious) whose cause is compromised by 
the UDHR’s limited containment of the right to move between countries and the 
right to asylum. Article 13 secures the individual’s right to leave any country but 
does not secure his right to enter another: “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom 
of movement and residence within the borders of each State. (2) Everyone has the 
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” This 
right is insufficient for the individual fleeing persecution since it is not followed 
up with the right to be granted asylum. Rather, Article 14 grants the persecuted 
individual the ambiguous right to “seek and enjoy” asylum: “Everyone has the 
right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” It is thus a 
question of interpretation whether or not the persecuted individual’s right to be 
granted asylum is secured in Article 14. However, it was certainly not the 
intention of the United Kingdom delegate, I. Corbet, who penned the phrase “and 
to enjoy asylum.” During the drafting process she explained that her intention with 
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the phrase “was not to grant to a person fleeing persecution the right to enter any 
and every country but to ensure for him the enjoyment of the right of asylum once 
that right had been granted him” (Corbet quoted in Morsink 1999: 78). What may 
be concluded from Article 13 and Article 14 is that the right to move between 
countries and the right to be granted asylum are not sufficiently secured in the 
UDHR, and this circumstance keeps refugees fixed in the marginal areas of the 
international human rights discourse. National borders and immigration laws 
would thus impose a boundary on the figure of human rights that separates and 
excludes the refugee from its order. The problem the refugee poses to the 
universality of human rights in their contemporary configuration can be 
understood by reference to Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) discussion of biopolitics 
and the rights of man. 
Agamben borrows the term biopolitics from Foucault to refer to how 
natural life is inscribed into the juridico-political order of the nation-state. 
Agamben shows that natural life is placed at the foundation of the modern nation-
state in the connection between birth and nationality. This connection is at the 
same time concealed and natural life is excluded as it “vanishes into the figure of 
the citizen” (Agamben 1998: 127). The foundation of the modern nation-state is 
thus aporetic in the sense that it is founded on something that it simultaneously 
excludes. 
To Agamben, the concept of the refugee represents a radical crisis in the 
state order by breaking down the originary fiction of modern sovereignty, namely, 
the supposed “continuity between man and citizen, nativity and nationality” 
(Agamben 1998: 131). The refugee brings light to the difference between birth and 
nation, and thus causes “the secret presupposition of the political domain—bare 
life—to appear for an instant within that domain. In this sense, the refugee is truly 
“the man of rights,” as Arendt suggests, the first and only real appearance of rights 
outside the fiction of the citizen that always covers them over” (ibid.). Agamben 
thus exposes the incapacity of the system of the nation-state to protect the so-
called “inalienable” rights of man “at the moment in which they can no longer 
take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state” (Agamben 1998: 126). 
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Agamben observes a contradiction in the way the United Nations and 
humanitarian organisations confront the problem of refugees and human rights 
protection: in order to represent and protect the refugee they separate the rights of 
man (that once made sense as the presupposition of the rights of the citizen) from 
the rights of the citizen. In other words, they conceive the refugee in terms of his 
bare life and not in terms of his citizenship. Humanitarianism is thus separated 
from politics—a separation that is reflected in the definition of the United 
Nations’ High Commission for Refugees’ mission, which, according to statute, is 
not to have a political but rather a “solely humanitarian and social” character 
(Agamben 1998: 132f). In thus grasping the refugee problem as a “humanitarian” 
concern, rather than a civil and political rights concern, the United Nations and 
humanitarian organisations reproduce the refugee problem by operating in perfect 
symmetry with state power that isolates bare life at the foundation of sovereignty 
(ibid: 133f). Like Derrida, Agamben suggests that the inclusion of the marginal 
refugee in the figure of human rights would require a total reconsideration of the 
fundamental axioms that produce the exclusion. We would thus have to reconsider 
in totality the fundamental categories of the nation-state that, as we have seen, 
function to exclude bare life from its order. These categories would include the 
birth-nation and the man-citizen links (ibid: 134). 
What should be clear by now is that human rights are neither universally 
applicable nor absolute essences. The construction of human rights as “universal” 
and “absolute” hides their fundamental instability by removing them “from the 
sphere of mundane and sectional interests, from the ebb and flow of historical 
change and contingency” (Harris 1996: 6f). The above discussion of excluded 
marginal areas in the international human rights discourse have served to show the 
importance of questioning, challenging and rethinking the foundations and 
discursive limits of human rights. Only through such deconstructive interrogation 
may the discourse of human rights be left structurally open towards the inclusion 
of its margins. With this in mind, I now turn to the interrogation of the foundations 
as well as the discursive limits and assumptions of human rights as they are 
constructed in the IRF policy discourse’s interpretation of the UDHR. 
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The IRF Policy Discourse’s Theist Interpretation of the UDHR 
The IRF policy discourse sees human rights as logically prior to and morally 
superior to the state. The introduction to the 2000 State Department Report on IRF 
asserts that the very universality of human rights depends exactly on their 
disassociation from the social and political realm: 
 
 [M]ost democratic traditions recognize that fundamental rights are not “grants” from 
the state or society but exist prior to both. If they do not—if human rights are in fact 
created by governments—then they cannot be said to be “universal” as the world 
acknowledged them to be in the 1948 Universal Declaration. […] If governments 
were the source of rights, governments could abolish them.26 
 
Had governments created rights, we would thus not be universal and they would 
be in danger of being abolished. The 2001 introduction further asserts: “The belief 
that fundamental human rights are not created by, but exist prior to, governments 
is reflected in international instruments as well.”27 These statements are certainly 
in congruence with the doctrine of inherence expressed in the UDHR, according to 
which governments cannot take away the individual’s human rights because they 
are inscribed in human essence. Had governments, on the other hand, created these 
rights, they rights would be nothing more than contingent articulations conditioned 
by cultural, political, economic circumstances; as easily granted as taken away. 
The IRF policy discourse thus addresses the aporia—the logical disjunction 
between the contextual embeddedness of rights and their declared universality—in 
the structure of the international human rights discourse. Unlike the UDHR, 
however, the IRF policy discourse tries to overcome the aporia by explicitly 
articulating a metaphysical “source” of universal rights now that social and 
political bodies and institutions have been disqualified. 
The introduction to the first State Department Report is especially 
comprehensive on the subject of the source of human rights. Here, then 
Ambassador at Large Robert Seiple starts out with explicitly connecting nature 
and human rights by articulating “human nature” and “universal truth” as the self-
                                                
26 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2000: 5). 
27 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2001: 1). 
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evident “realities undergirding and legitimising the Universal Declaration itself.”28 
Human nature is thus conceived of as a reality in whose essence human rights are 
inscribed. It also follows from this logic that if governments had created human 
rights, these rights would not reside in nature and consequently not be “a reality.” 
True to the form of natural law theory, we thus see that the IRF policy discourse 
places emphasis on the notion of a common human nature that implies comparable 
rights and equality for all human beings. 
Seiple, however, not only assumes the objective, external existence of 
metaphysical natural laws that confer rights upon individual human beings; he also 
believes that these laws are divinely governed. In his interpretation of the UDHR’s 
first article he thus devolves the authority of nature on a theological foundation: 
“Every human being, declares the Declaration, is “endowed with reason and 
conscience;” reason and conscience direct us to the source of that endowment, an 
orientation typically expressed in religion.”29 To Seiple, the verb “endow” and the 
phrase “reason and conscience” in Article 1 become the point of entry for religion 
in his interpretation of the UDHR. “Endow” implies an endower, and this source is 
“typically” realised by reason and conscience grounded in religion. To Seiple, 
there are good reasons for choosing to ground human rights in religion: 
 
 [W]hen the concept of human dignity is understood as grounded in religion, it 
becomes a bridge for people of all faiths. It roots the concern for human rights in 
metaphysical soil and guards against its exploitation for more transient ends. Indeed, 
when so defined, human dignity becomes more than a human idea. It becomes a 
reality, a part of the natural order of things. So understood, all human rights—as 
expressed in international covenants—take on a more profound meaning. When 
people do evil to others, it is not simply a practical rule that is being violated, but the 
nature of the world itself.30 
 
As we see in the above, Seiple conceives of religion and nature as inseparably 
connected. In order for human dignity to become “a part of the natural order of 
things,” it must be grounded in religion. Religion thus becomes the vehicle 
                                                
28 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 1999: 1). 
29 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 1999: 2). 
30 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 1999: 2). 
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through which human dignity is displaced from the realm of “human ideas” and 
“practical rules” to “reality.” The capability of religion to project human dignity 
onto nature makes sense within Seiple’s theist natural law framework if the 
Creator is perceived as the origin of the Law of Nature. Whereas the human is the 
origin of practical rules, God is the origin of natural law, and human ideas are thus 
subordinated to the idea of divine laws.  
 In his critique of Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762),31 Derrida questions 
the idea of natural rights by arguing that “natural” rights cannot claim to be natural 
because they are constituted discursively through the contract. Thus challenging 
the ontological foundation of rights, Derrida shows that rights are fundamentally 
unstable and, consequently, open to a multitude of different articulations 
(Newman 2005: 97). Saul Newman (2005) offers the following reading of the 
implications of Derrida’s interrogation of natural rights: 
 
 These rights then are displaced from the social to the natural realm, and the social is 
subordinated to the natural, just as writing was subordinated to speech. As Derrida 
suggests in his critique of Rousseau, the social is the supplement which threatens and, 
at the same time is necessary for, the identity of the natural. The idea of natural rights 
can only be formulated discursively through the contract. Therefore there is no pure 
natural foundation for rights, and this leaves them open to change and 
reinterpretation. They can no longer remain inscribed within human essence and, 
therefore, can no longer be taken for granted (Newman 2005: 97f). 
 
We might observe the same about the God-given natural rights constituted in the 
IRF policy discourse. Since the idea of these rights can only be formulated 
discursively through the IRF policy discourse, they cannot be purely founded in 
theological and metaphysical laws. The identity of God-given natural rights is 
dependent on the political realm of “policies” for its constitution. These rights are 
thus not conditioned by God but by the historical, economic, political, cultural and 
even financial circumstances of the social context in which they are articulated 
(Dicke 2002: 118). 
                                                
31 According to Rousseau’s social contract theory, natural persons join the state and give up their natural rights to 
become citizens and get civil rights in return. Should the civil rights fail to respect people’s natural rights, the 
people have the right to overturn their government (Baumann 1999: 7). 
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Religious Freedom: The “First Freedom” of Human Rights? 
The religious perspective on human rights is not alien to the American rights 
tradition—the theist natural law approach was immensely influential in the 1776 
American Declaration of Independence, which spoke of people as “being endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights” (Ashbee & Ashford 1999: 22). 
Later introductions to the State Department Reports on IRF affirm the connection 
between the IRF policy discourse’s understanding of international human rights 
and the American rights tradition. In the 2001 introduction, for example, the 
unidentified writer asserts that: “The Founders believed in the universality of 
human dignity—that all human beings are endowed by the Creator with certain 
rights that are theirs by virtue of their existence.”32 Seiple’s successor John 
Hanford similarly states that: “We as a nation have always affirmed the principle 
that our Creator has endowed all people with fundamental rights and freedoms. 
We hold these rights to be sacred and inviolable.”33 
The IRF policy discourse sees no conflict in merging the American rights 
tradition with international standards on human rights: “U.S. policy draws deeply 
on two traditions: the history and commitment of the American people, and the 
standards established by the international community. These two traditions not 
only are consistent but are mutually supportive.”34 However, as we shall now see, 
the quasi-religious theory of human rights developed by Seiple in the introduction 
to the first State Department Report on IRF is actually inconsistent with this 
perception of mutual compatibility between the two traditions. Not only does the 
IRF policy discourse’s constitution of human rights challenge the previously noted 
outright secularity of the UDHR; it also challenges the Preamble’s call for a 
“common understanding” of human rights as the necessary precondition for the 
full realisation of the UDHR. 
The seventh recital of the Preamble to the UDHR reads: “Whereas a 
common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance 
                                                
32 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2001: 1). 
33 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2003: 1). 
34 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2001: 1). 
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for the full realization of this pledge” (UDHR 1948: Preamble). According to the 
U.N. General Assembly, this “common understanding” is built on the notion that 
all rights are equally important, indivisible and interdependent: “All human rights 
and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and 
urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and 
protection of both civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights 
[…].”35 
The IRF policy discourse’s explicit articulation of theological and 
metaphysical absolutes as the authorising foundations of human rights might not 
conflict with the “common understanding” of human rights per se since it 
concerns the underlying philosophical justification of these rights. However, the 
American rights tradition has might have influenced the interpretation of the 
UDHR in more aspects than the articulation of human rights as God-given. There 
is a final aspect to the quasi-religious theory of human rights developed by Seiple 
that we shall now examine, namely, his radical rearticulation of central elements 
in the UDHR. This rearticulation imposes a hierarchy of human rights and thus 
threatens the principle of their indivisibility and interdependence. Seiple builds 
this radical interpretative move on Article 18 of the UDHR: 
 
 “Everyone,” affirms the Declaration, “has the right to freedom, conscience, and 
religion; this right includes the freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship or observance” (Article 18). Thus, 
while religion can be a source of conflict, religious freedom—the right to pursue 
one’s faith without interference—can be a cornerstone of human dignity and of all 
human rights. To protect religious freedom is to protect a human endeavor that 
directly addresses the foundation of human dignity.36 
 
Whilst the UDHR as a whole rests on the concept of the dignity of the human 
person within the human family, Seiple uses Article 18 to rearticulate the relation 
between human dignity and religious freedom so that dignity becomes grounded in 
                                                
35 Resolution 32/130, “Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for 
improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” adopted by the General Assembly 
on the 16th of December 1977. Source: http://un.org/documents/ga/res/32/ares32.htm (site accessed 25/09/09). 
36 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 1999: 2). 
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religious freedom. Whereas human dignity is the foundation of religious freedom 
in the UDHR, religious freedom thus becomes the foundation of human dignity in 
the IRF policy discourse. In this way, religious freedom becomes the lynchpin of 
all human rights and thus ceases to exist on the same level as other rights. By 
making religious freedom the highest human right, Seiple would thus seem to 
impose a hierarchy of human rights although no international consensus exists 
regarding which rights are more important than others.37 
It should, furthermore, be noted that although the unidentified author of the 
introduction to the 2000 State Department Report38 seemingly disregards Seiple’s 
radical theory by substituting it with a new theory in which “religious freedom and 
conscience” are presented as “a cornerstone of democracy”39 rather than a 
cornerstone of human rights, Seiple’s successor, the President George W. Bush 
appointed John Hanford revives Seiple’s quasi-religious theory of human rights. 
Hanford even quotes Seiple’s sentence “while religion can be a source of conflict, 
religious freedom – the right to pursue one’s faith without interference – can be a 
cornerstone of human dignity and of all human rights” in his 2004 introduction, 
noting that it “articulated the holistic priority of religious freedom.”40 Seiple’s 
quasi-religious theory was thus just as relevant to the self-legitimisation of the IRF 
policy discourse under Seiple’s short stretch as Ambassador under President Bill 
Clinton as it was during Hanford’s years under the Bush administration. 
The rearticulation of religious freedom as the foundation of human dignity 
and human rights can also be comprehended in the light of Seiple’s 
aforementioned religious understanding of reason and conscience. Dominique 
Decherf (2001) offers a particularly interesting reading of Seiple’s theory of 
human rights. He notes that Seiple, in arguing that religious freedom directly 
addresses the foundation of human dignity, actually reconciles the first article of 
the UDHR with the American experiment in which religious freedom is “the first 
                                                
37 “The only true international consensus regarding human rights lies in the listing of rights in the Declaration. 
Though states cannot agree on the prioritizing of these rights, states can and have agreed as to their status as 
human rights. The Declaration stands as proof of the ability of states to identify those rights belonging to every 
human. But, at the same time, the Declaration provides evidence of the international community's unwillingness to 
rank human rights” (Wuerffel 1998). 
38 Seiple had resigned at this point. 
39 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2000: 5). 
40 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2004: 1). 
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freedom” of the Constitution.41 Decherf arrives at this reading by noting Seiple’s 
synonymous understanding of reason and conscience and religion: “If religion is 
already included in article 1 in “reason and conscience”, understanding those two 
words and especially conscience as synonymous with religion, it is the first of all 
rights and the very condition of others” (Decherf 2001: 16). In other words, if 
reason and conscience are understood religiously, religion becomes present in the 
first article of the UDHR and can thus be considered the first of all human rights. 
From this perspective, Seiple’s religious understanding of reason and conscience 
makes religious freedom the “first right” of the UDHR, just as it is “the first 
freedom” of the Constitution.” Thus, Seiple arguably manages to reconcile the 
UDHR with the American tradition, in spite of his denial of doing so: 
  
 Grounded in and informed by the American experience, in which religious liberty is 
“the first freedom” of the Constitution, the law nevertheless does not attempt to 
impose “the American way” on other nations. Rather, it draws on the internationally 
accepted belief in the inviolable dignity of the human person and of the universal 
rights that flow from that belief. 42 
 
Moreover, Co-creator of the IRFA William Inboden’s may be noted for a similar 
statement: “This Act is not trying to codify the First Amendment overseas, but 
rather to build on Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other international accords” (William Inboden in Hackett, Silk & Hoover 2000: 
14). 
What this shows is that the IRFA cannot ground itself in both the 
international human rights tradition and the American tradition without avoiding 
accusations of cultural imperialism since the two traditions clearly differ in their 
view of the role of religious freedom within the international human rights 
framework. The UDHR propagates equal attention to all human rights, while the 
IRFA propagates a hierarchic emphasis on religious freedom. The disproportional 
emphasis on religious freedom is reflected not only in the theory of human rights 
developed in the IRF policy discourse, but also in the IRFA’s method for the 
                                                
41 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 1999: 1). 
42 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 1999: 2). 
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realisation of religious freedom on the international scene. In establishing an 
Office of IRF, a Commission and a Special Adviser on IRF as well as a 
mechanism of Presidential actions to be taken in response to foreign states’ 
violations of religious freedom, the IRFA establishes a de facto preference for 
religious freedom and thus a hierarchy of human rights in American law (Wuerffel 
1998). 
However, since the authority of the IRFA as a national statute with an 
international scope depends on the law’s image as an articulation consistent with 
the standards of international human rights, the reconciliation between 
international human rights and the American rights tradition presents a serious 
challenge to the law’s international legitimacy. The IRFA is in conflict with the 
international human rights regime that it claims authorises it. It would thus serve 
to strengthen the IRFA’s cause if the IRF policy discourse distinguished between 
the two traditions and their separate tasks of protecting human rights respectively 
inside and outside of the United States’ borders. As one scholar reminds us: 
 
 Whenever a state acts unilaterally in the protection of human rights, it cannot ignore 
the context within which it acts, for this context is the international community. The 
United States acts to protect human rights inside and outside its borders. The 
Declaration of Independence, with its listing of the inalienable rights of “life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness,” and the Bill of Rights have served as the sources for 
the United States' commitment to human rights on a domestic level. The United 
States commitment to the protection of human rights outside of its borders, however, 
derives from its obligations as a Declaration signatory. To ignore this fact is to ignore 
the basis upon which the struggle for human rights began and the pledge which the 
member states took in their signing of the Universal Declaration: full realization of 
human rights lies in a common understanding of them (Wuerffel 1998). 
 
Strengthening the IRFA in this way, would mean addressing the human rights 
hierarchy imposed by the law by legislating in a way that avoids running counter 
to the principle of indivisibility and interdependence. This would thus entail 
coming to terms with the United States’ history of hesitancy and selectivity with 
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regards to the ratification of international human rights instruments43 and altering 
legislation to protect all human rights equally instead of emphasising some to the 
detriment of others. 
Moreover, the IRF policy discourse’s reconciliation between international 
human rights standards and the domestic rights tradition may create more conflict 
than resolution on an international level. As one of the principal drafters of the 
UDHR, René Cassin, remarked in a retrospective essay, the success of the 
Declaration in finding worldwide acceptance was probably largely due to the fact 
that it is a secular document (Morsink 1999: 290). Founding human dignity and, 
consequently, all human rights in the notion of “a Creator” as well as “religion” 
and “religious freedom” could thus work to the detriment of the IRFA’s 
justificatory cause. For example, the IRF policy discourse’s unprecedented 
emphasis on the role of religion and religious freedom in international human 
rights only provides more ammunition to critics accusing the IRFA of supporting a 
religious (Christian right) agenda such as the proselytization of Christianity 
abroad. Indeed, Article 18 of the UDHR, which is singled out in the IRF policy 
discourse as especially important, even has its own proselytization controversy. 
During the drafting process of the UDHR, there was a hefty debate over the 
article’s formulation of the right to change one’s religious convictions. The debate 
centred on the problems of proselytism and the behaviour of missionaries in 
foreign countries, which some delegations felt this right supported. The ultimate 
decision to keep the right to change one’s religious convictions in Article 18 
caused strong objections from especially Muslim delegations and resulted in a 
Saudi Arabian abstention from the final vote on the Declaration (ibid: 261f). 
 
A Unilateral Violence Without Ground 
In this chapter I have attempted to deconstruct the authority of the IRFA by 
interrogating the foundations of human rights as they are contained in both the 
UDHR and the IRF policy discourse. I have interrogated both discourses in order 
                                                
43 For example, the United States ratified the ICCPR only in 1992 and did so with reservations, understandings and 
declarations that substantially nullified its effect (Yasuaki 1999: 111). Moreover, the United States has yet to ratify 
the ICESR. 
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to simultaneously highlight the different ways in which the IRF policy discourse’s 
conception of human rights deviates from the UDHR discourse. In this process, I 
have found the IRF policy discourse’s interpretation of human rights to be 
inconsistent with the “common understanding” of human rights that the Preamble 
of the UDHR calls for and that the United Nations General Assembly defines with 
terms such as “equal importance,” “indivisibility” and “interdependence.” What 
remains now in my quest to deconstruct the authority of the IRF policy discourse 
and expose its connection to unfounded violence is an answer to the question: 
what authorises the IRF policy discourse’s interpretation of international human 
rights? 
If we interrogate the origins of the IRF policy discourse’s interpretation of 
international human rights, it becomes clear that no anterior legitimacy on the 
international level authorises it. In going against the “common understanding” of 
human rights and rearticulating central elements of the UDHR, the IRF policy 
discourse clearly does not recognise the authority of the dominant interpretation of 
international human rights instruments. In that sense, the IRF policy discourse 
paradoxically ends up undermining the very condition it claims authorises it. In 
what Derrida terms the “revolutionary moment” at the foundation of all laws 
(Derrida 1992b: 36), the United States suspends the order of existing international 
human rights law and interrupts it to unilaterally found another law. This new law, 
the IRFA, disregards the preceding order by establishing a new hierarchic 
understanding of human rights that favours religious freedom. The discursive 
violence of this reinterpretation corresponds to what Derrida terms originary 
violence. The IRFA’s interpretation of international human rights is the “violence 
without ground” that founds the law. At the same time, however, this discursive 
violence is excluded and disavowed by IRFA, which is reflected in its insistence 
on being a cohesive expression of international human rights standards. The 
structure of the IRFA is thus aporetic. The law’s constitution depends on a 
violence that is excluded from its structure and which thus prevents the law from 
forming a closed identity. 
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As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the non-legal character of 
originary violence presents a problem for the authority that it establishes. Derrida 
defines this problem in by posing the question: 
 
 How are we to distinguish between the force of law of a legitimate power and the 
supposedly originary violence that must have established this authority and that could 
not itself have been authorised by any anterior legitimacy, so that, in this initial 
moment, it is neither legal nor illegal—or, others would quickly say, neither just nor 
unjust? (Derrida 1992b: 6). 
 
Here Derrida refers to Walter Benjamin’s distinction between two kinds of violence 
connected to law: law-making violence and law-preserving violence. Law-making 
violence is the originary violence that, as we have already seen, institutes and 
positions law. Law-preserving violence, on the other hand, is “the violence that 
conserves, the one that maintains, confirms, insures the permanence and 
enforceability of law” (Derrida 1992b: 31). Derrida’s point in highlighting these two 
kinds of violence is that they cannot be clearly distinguished from one another. 
This means that the law-making violence taints the law-preserving violence 
because the law-making violence cannot be completely excluded from the 
structure of the law. As Derrida points out by referencing Benjamin, the relation 
between law-making and law-preserving violence is a relation of representation: 
“Benjamin says that that founding violence is “represented” (repräsentiert) in 
conservative violence” (Derrida 1992b: 55). Thus, while originary violence is not 
necessarily immediately present in a law, this paradoxically does not mean that it is 
completely absent from it. The presence of originary violence will always be “hidden” 
in the law-preserving violence that replaces or represents it. Derrida describes this 
relation as “the very passage from presence to representation” (Derrida 1992b: 47). 
The punitive unilateral sanctions authorised by the IRFA correspond to 
Benjamin’s concept of law-preserving violence. These so-called Presidential actions 
are the violent means that insure the enforceability of the IRFA. As we have seen, the 
IRFA claims that it its punitive measures are meant to conserve not only itself but also 
international human rights standards by coercing foreign governments into respecting 
religious freedom. As this chapter has also shown, however, the IRFA paradoxically 
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undermines the international human rights standards it claims to conserve by 
unilaterally imposing a hierarchy on human rights. This unilateral originary violence 
is also clearly reflected or represented in the IRFA’s law-preserving violence. Just 
like the IRFA’s interpretation of international human rights lacked the legitimacy of 
international authority, the unilateral sanctions it authorises lack multi-state input as 
well as legitimacy by the United Nations and other international organisations 
(Lavers 2001). We thus see that the non-legal, unilateral violence that instituted the 
IRFA taints the violent means through which the law is enforced. In other words, the 
IRFA’s illegitimate founding violence haunts its structure, rendering its authority 
fundamentally ambiguous and open to question. 
Having thus destabilised the authority of the IRFA and, consequently, the IRF 
policy discourse, I now move on to an examining the link between the IRFA and 
American sovereignty on a global level. As we shall now see, the IRF policy 
discourse is not only concerned with identifying violations of religious freedom, it 
also meticulously constructs the American identity in the image of religious freedom. 
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3   American Sovereignty and Domination 
 
 
 
 
The Geography of Religious Freedom 
The IRF policy discourse places strong emphasis on asserting “the right of all 
countries to speak out when human rights, including religious freedom, are 
abused.”44 The discourse does thus not believe that violations of human rights 
should be addressed exclusively in international forums: 
 
 Indeed, as elaborated elsewhere in this Report, the United States agrees that issues of 
religious freedom ought to be addressed in international forums. It does so regularly 
and vigorously. But the United States also believes that all nations have the right, and 
the obligation, to address on a bilateral basis with other nations those international 
standards they themselves have accepted.45 
 
According the IRF policy discourse, it is not just a question of having the right to 
address violations of human rights bilaterally; violations of human rights instil in 
the onlooker a sense of moral obligation to act. International human rights treaties 
are thus viewed as binding agreements that commit signatory states not only to 
adhere to their standards, but also to monitor and be monitored by each other on 
the basis of these standards and be morally obliged to intervene in instances of 
human rights violations. In the IRF policy discourse’s understanding of 
international relations, all states are thus viewed as potentially equal actors that 
relate to one another on the international level on the basis of international human 
rights standards. The IRFA can thus be understood in relation to the commands 
brought forth by the introduction of human rights in international relations. At the 
                                                
44 Frequently Asked Questions: IRF Report and Countries of Particular Concern. Internet: 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/c13003.htm (14 Oct. 2009). 
45 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2000: 4). 
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same time, however, this view of international relations would seem assume the 
equal power of all states “to address on a bilateral basis with other nations those 
international standards they themselves have accepted”—an assumption that may 
be problematised by a theoretical glance into the effect human rights have had on 
international relations. 
Theorists agree that the post-war human rights revolution marked by the 
UDHR initiated the gradual decline of Westphalian sovereignty. Since then, the 
“international community” has increasingly been seen to have legitimate interests 
in what goes on within countries in terms of human rights, and the consequent 
human rights interventions have made the norms of state sovereignty increasingly 
contingent (Ikenberry 2008: 423). The problem with the concept of “humanitarian 
intervention,” however, is that it is situated in a grey zone that Algerian President 
Bouteflika has pointed to by asking: “Where is the dividing line between 
humanitarian, political and economic intervention? Are only weak or weakened 
states candidates for intervention or does it hold for all without exception?” 
(quoted in Beck 2006: 143). Indeed, one of the implications of the transformation 
of interstate norms is that powerful states now have a new “licence” to intervene 
in the domestic affairs of weak and troubled states since there are fewer principled 
and normative inhibitions on intervention (Ikenberry 2008: 424). Ulrich Beck 
(2006) employs the notion of a geography of human rights to address this 
problematic related to human rights intervention and geopolitical asymmetry. 
Beck’s point is that the human rights revolution has not completely abolished 
sovereignty; rather, sovereignty has been redistributed in favour of the powerful 
West. Asserts Beck: “The cultural, legal and moral transcending boundaries 
favours the emergence of a cosmopolitan monopoly of the West on morality, law 
and violence” (Beck 2006: 143). In that sense, the geography of human rights can 
be understood as a discourse that redraws old colonial maps by empowering the 
West while keeping the Third World in a submissive position. 
In this chapter I argue along the same lines that the IRF policy discourse 
establishes a geography of religious freedom by inscribing the world in the binary 
hierarchy of “religious freedom”/“violations of religious freedom”. Only, the IRF 
policy discourse does not impose this structure in favour of the West in general, 
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but in favour of the United States exclusively. This is most evident in the moral-
superiority code that I examine in depth later in this chapter. In this code, the IRF 
policy discourse constructs the United States as a paragon of religious freedom, 
whereas scepticism or hostility towards minority religions is externalised to all 
foreign states. When one adds this moral-superiority code to the IRF policy 
discourse’s understanding of international relations, it becomes possible to view 
the discourse as a whole as a vindication for American economic intervention to 
seek control of a given state’s steering mechanism in regards to religious freedom. 
Within the IRF policy discourse’s logic, such an intervention would, of course, be 
for the country in question’s own moral benefit. 
 The exclusion of other Western democracies from the stronger pole in the 
binary hierarchy of “religious freedom”/“violations of religious freedom” has 
certain sovereign characteristics that are important to note too. In the introduction 
to the 2000 State Department Report the unidentified writer asserts: “Religious 
freedom is a good, not a danger from which citizens must be protected—a fact that 
even some mature democracies have not yet accepted.”46 Here the introduction 
refers to one of the five barriers to religious freedom that the executive summaries 
of the State Department Reports use to classify foreign states,47 namely, 
“stigmatization of certain religions by wrongfully associating them with dangerous 
“cults” or “sects.””48 This category has been applied to primarily European 
countries, for example, France and Greece, but most notably Germany where the 
authorities have monitored and attempted to ban Scientology for years under the 
claim that the movement’s structures and methods poses both a danger to the 
individual’s mental health as well as a possible threat to the country’s rule of law 
                                                
46 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2000: 4). 
47 The five categories are: 1) “Totalitarian or authoritarian attempts to control religious belief or practice;” 2) 
“State hostility toward minority or non-approved religions;” 3) “State neglect of the problem of discrimination 
against, or persecution of, minority or non-approved religions;” 4) “Discriminatory legislation or policies 
disadvantaging certain religions;” and 5) “Stigmatization of certain religions by wrongfully associating them with 
dangerous “cults” or “sects” (Executive Summary to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. 
Department of State 2001). 
48 In the Executive Summary to the the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of 
State 2001), the category is described as follows: “The governments of a few countries, in an attempt to protect 
their citizens from dangerous or harmful groups, have adopted discriminating laws and policies. By blurring the 
distinctions between religions and violent or fraudulent groups, the governments of these countries have 
disadvantaged groups that may appear to be different or unusual, but are in fact peaceful and straightforward.  In 
all of these countries, existing criminal law is sufficient to address criminal behavior by groups of individuals. 
New laws or policies that criminalize or stigmatize religious expression can put religious freedom at risk.” 
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and “democratic order.”49 The IRF policy discourse thus inscribes Western 
democracies in the weaker pole of the “religious freedom”/“violations of religious 
freedom” binary if they “wrongfully” view some “religions” as “a danger from 
which the citizens must be protected.” Here, the IRF policy discourse thus 
displays what would appear to be a sovereign power to define and distinguish 
between “religions” and “cults” or “sects.” Let us now examine more closely this 
exclusive sovereignty that is redistributed in favour of the United States with the 
institution of the IRFA. 
 
The Sovereign Exclusion of the United States 
The position the IRFA establishes for the United States is well understood through 
the prism of Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) thoughts on sovereignty. Drawing on Carl 
Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign, Agamben argues that sovereignty, like the 
extra-legal violence that grounds the law, marks the limit of the juridical order by 
being simultaneously inside and outside the law. The sovereign embodies this 
paradox in virtue of his legal power to decide the exception to the law. The power 
to suspend the law places the sovereign inside the law, while he uses this legal 
power to simultaneously place himself outside the law (Agamben 1998: 15). To 
Saul Newman (2005) sovereignty is the point where violence and law intersect 
and become indistinguishable from one another. Writes Newman: 
 
 From this perspective, the claims of the sovereign state to moral and legal legitimacy 
would be precarious – what lies at the heart of sovereignty is not the public good, but 
rather a dimension of violence that is beyond the limits of the law. Moreover, the law 
cannot protect us from the violence of the state, because it is itself grounded 
ultimately in this violence (Newman 2005: 94). 
 
The law’s self-professed aim is create order by protecting the victims of religious 
persecution from a violence either conducted, condoned or ignored by their respective 
governments. However, since the IRFA is grounded in the unilateral violence of the 
                                                
49 “Germany moves to ban Scientology” (8 Dec. 2007). Internet: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7133867.stm 
(17 Oct. 2009). For more on religious persecution in Western Europe and the issue of Scientology see Hackett, 
Silk & Hoover (2000: 33-44). 
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United States, it cannot protect anyone from the violence of the United States. As a 
foreign policy law, the IRFA positions the United States as the global sovereign, 
making all foreign countries its legal subjects. In doing so, the IRFA thus creates a 
sovereign sphere in which foreign states may be justly punished with economic 
sanctions. Moreover, since the subjects of the IRFA’s enunciation—foreign states—
also contain the very individuals and minorities the IRFA acts to protect, not even 
they are safe. As we saw in chapter 1, the IRFA does include a rhetorical recognition 
of the President’s need to seek to minimise any adverse impact on a targeted 
country’s population, should he decide to sanction it.50 However, since the protective 
steps to minimise adverse effects are not further specified in the IRFA, it would seem 
that its attempt to protect the weakest groups in target states (including persecuted 
religious minorities) fails. 
The IRF policy discourse expresses the paradox of sovereignty by 
excluding the United States as legal subject. The discourse situates the United 
States outside of the IRFA, while at the same time declaring that there is no 
outside of the law. The IRF policy discourse displays this sovereign power to 
define the exception in at least two ways. Firstly, it does not include the United 
States in either the State Department Reports or the independent Commission 
Reports on IRF. As one scholar points out: “This failure supports the claim that 
the United States believes it is superior to the rest of the world on human rights 
values” (Fore 2002: 449). However, the glaring absence of the United States in the 
Reports not only makes the United States appear superior; it also threatens the 
very universality of human rights that the State Department Reports argue for by 
presenting religious freedom as a paradigm that applies only to other countries and 
not to the United States itself. Secondly, the IRF policy discourse places the 
United States outside the reach of any law—national or international—by 
precluding the judicial review of any sentence or action taken under the authority 
of the IRFA: “No court shall have jurisdiction to review any Presidential 
determination or agency action under this Act or any amendment made by this 
Act” (IRFA 1998: Section 410). 
We thus see that the IRF policy discourse’s exclusion of the United States 
from the scrutiny of the IRFA effectually positions the country as the global sovereign 
                                                
50 See Chapter 1, section: “Presidential Actions in Response to Violations.” 
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in relation to religious freedom, a position that only grants all other states conditional 
sovereignty in return. The originary unilateral violence that founded the IRFA can 
thus be understood as more than an interpretative discursive violence that undermines 
the “common understanding” of human rights and taints the law’s coercive means; the 
IRFA’s founding violence can also be understood as the imposition of a new 
hierarchic relation between the United States and the rest of the world. As we shall 
now examine in more depth, the chosen mode of self-representation enhances this 
hierarchic relation by bringing a dimension of moral superiority into the IRF policy 
discourse’s binary structure. 
 
The Limits of the Founding Myth 
The IRFA and the State Department Reports do much more than simply offer 
analysis of the “reality” they confront; these texts also actively concern themselves 
with the scripting of a particular American identity in whose name the IRFA is 
implemented. As we shall now see, the IRF policy discourse inscribes the 
American identity in the binary opposition that structures the IRFA, namely, 
“religious freedom”/“violations of religious freedom.” In doing so the United 
States externalises violations of religious freedom to foreign states. The aim of 
these next two sections is to destabilise the IRF policy discourse’s uniform 
construction of the American identity by foregrounding violent identities 
excluded, marginalised and silenced by the discourse because they do not fit its 
chosen mode of identity. The analysis thus shows, like Derrida, that no identity is 
pure and closed, but always tainted by that which it excludes. 
In the introduction to the 2007 State Department Report, John Hanford 
declares that: “The Annual Report on International Religious Freedom Report is a 
natural outgrowth of our country’s history and a current reflection of our 
values.”51 As this quote suggests, the role of religious freedom in American 
history is greatly emphasised in the IRF policy discourse. In fact, religious 
freedom is most often constructed as ever-present in the history of the United 
States. For example, the 2001 introduction asserts that: 
 
                                                
51 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2007: 2). 
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 The United States has a longstanding commitment to religious liberty. America’s 
founders made religious freedom the first freedom of the Constitution—giving it 
pride of place among those liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights—because they 
believed that guaranteeing the right to search for transcendent truths and ultimate 
human purpose was a critical component of a durable democracy.52 
 
Religious freedom is thus not only constructed as constitutive of American 
culture, it is also placed at the top of the hierarchy of the liberties enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights, thus implying that religious freedom is the most critical 
component of a “durable democracy.” Chapter 2 has already examined how 
religious freedom’s “pride of place” in the Bill of rights might have affected the 
IRF policy discourse’s interpretation of human rights and raised the question of 
whether the United States is trying to export this “pride of place” to the rest of the 
world. The prominence given to the First Amendment in the State Department 
Reports also shows its importance in the American self-conception. Although the 
IRFA itself does not mention the First Amendment,53 it still situates itself in 
American history by constructing a narrative in which religious freedom is 
articulated as a key aspect of the American tradition. The first “finding” of the 
IRFA thus reads: 
 
 The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the 
United States. Many of our Nation’s founders fled religious persecution abroad, 
cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of religious freedom They established 
in law, as a fundamental right and as the pillar of our Nation, the right to freedom of 
religion. From its birth to this day, the United States has prized this legacy of 
religious freedom and honoured this heritage by standing for religious freedom and 
offering refuge to those suffering religious persecution (IRFA 1998: Section 2). 
 
Like in the previous quote from the 2001 introduction, we find that the first 
finding discursively links religious freedom to “our Nation’s founders.” It also 
links religious freedom to “our Nation’s […] birth” as well as to the concepts of 
                                                
52 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2001: 1). 
53 Perhaps to avoid aforementioned accusations of attempting to export the First Amendment, we may speculate. 
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“legacy” and “heritage” to the effect of making religious freedom and American 
identity appear inseparably connected. 
As Stuart Hall reminds us, however, the construction of identities through 
binary oppositions is both a reductionist and over-simplifying practice in the sense 
that all distinctions and subtleties are swallowed up in the rigid two-part structure 
(Hall 1997: 235). In order to fit the American identity into the category “religious 
freedom,” other identities must be marginalised, silenced or denied. In the above 
quoted first finding of the IRFA, for example, the history of religious persecution 
in the United States is denied so that the United States may emerge as a country 
that has respected religious freedom “from its birth to this day.” Scholars such as 
Winnifred Sullivan (1999) were also quick to contest the historical accuracy of the 
IRFA’s first finding, accusing it of perpetuating exceptionalist myths about 
American history. Particularly the articulation of “our Nation’s founders” as 
people who both fled religious persecution and “established in law […] the right to 
freedom of religion” is problematic to Sullivan, who contends: 
 
 Who are “they”? If by “our nation’s founders” is meant those who fought the 
revolution and wrote the Constitution, none of them fled persecution. If “they” means 
the colonial founders, a few “cherished” religious liberty, William Penn, Roger 
Williams, and arguably Lord Baltimore. Most did not. The last sentence of section 2 
is simply untrue. The United States has continuously denied religious freedom to 
some of its citizens, African-Americans, Mormons, Catholics, and Native Americans, 
among others, and it has refused to admit refugees persecuted for their religion, 
including Jewish refuges from Nazi Germany (Sullivan 1999). 
 
However deceitful or mythical, this way of representing the past is not foreign to 
the construction of American identity in American foreign policy. This is shown in 
David Campbell’s (1998) historical analysis of the modes of inclusion and 
exclusion applied in the production and reproduction of the American identity in 
American foreign policy. Campbell’s study finds fictional representation of the 
past a central part of these identity practices, noting that “an endless array of 
modern political leaders have conjured up the Puritans and the “Founding Fathers” 
to be protagonists of particular positions in contemporary controversies” 
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(Campbell 1998: 131). As a consequence of this fictional use of the past, a 
seemingly paradoxical relationship between time and space arises in the 
production and reproduction of the American identity: 
 
 Europeans who encountered the New World went out of their way to deny its 
historicity. Accordingly, the space that is America has taken on such significance that 
it becomes history. With all its qualities present at its genesis, America is understood 
as the land of freedom that derives its meaning from the frontier. Born modern, 
“‘American’ identity obviates the usual distinctions of national history – divisions of 
class, complexities of time and place – because the very meaning of American 
involves a cultural, not a national myth of consensus.”54 In consequence, the history 
of America is effectively de-historicized, for this privileging of the spatial over the 
temporal in American experience has given history the quality of an eternal present 
(Campbell 1998: 131f). 
 
This de-historicising mechanism is also at work in the IRF policy discourse’s 
construction and use of historical narratives. Religious freedom is privileged as 
present at the very founding of the country thus giving American history this 
quality of “an eternal present.” As a consequence, the image of United States 
emerges as static and iconic—a paragon of religious freedom. 
Perhaps in reaction to the critique of the exceptionalist construction of 
American history in the IRFA’s first finding, the subsequent introductions to the 
State Department Reports do start to note that American history does not 
constitute the perfect example of religious freedom. In the introduction to the 2005 
State Department Report, for example, John Hanford notes that: “Our record is not 
perfect. However, our imperfections cannot serve as an excuse to back down from 
the challenge of making this universal right real for all humankind.”55 Hanford 
thus falls back on the universality of human rights in order to brush away 
suggestions that human rights “imperfections” in American history might 
undermine the legitimacy of the IRF policy discourse. 
 
                                                
54 Campbell quotes Bercovitch’s work American Jeremiad. 
55 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2005: 2). 
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The Limits of the Construction of the American Present 
The acknowledgement of past imperfections does not mean that the IRF policy 
discourse discontinues referring to American history in its construction of the 
American identity. I argue that the discourse merely substitutes the construction of 
the perfect past with the construction of the perfect present. In the introduction to 
the 2008 State Department Report, John Hanford thus contends that: “We are 
blessed to live in a country where freedom is respected.”56 Likewise, the 
introduction to the 2000 State Department Report asserts: “But today, at the dawn 
of the third millennium, religions are flourishing in the United States, their 
respective traditions enriching not only their own adherents, but American public 
policy as well.”57 We thus see that the construction of the United States as the 
world’s paragon of religious freedom is restored in the present. At the same time, 
the American identity’s binary relation with the IRFA’s subjects of enunciation is 
also restored and the United States can re-emerge as the ideological ideal against 
which all other nations must be measured and judged. 
This construction of an American paragon of the present can, however, also 
be contested by showing how violations of religious freedom still occur today in 
the United States and thus partly constitute the American state identity. One such 
example may be found in the American Model Penal Code’s58 criminalisation of 
polygamy—the right to multiple spouses—in the United States. Obvious targets of 
this criminalisation are Mormons and others who claim the religious right to 
polygamy. Interestingly, the Model Penal Code not only makes bigamy—where 
two or more spouses are unaware of each other—a crime, it makes the variety 
“polygamy” in which all participating spouses are aware of one another and enter 
into the marriage voluntarily the more serious of the two crimes: “A person is 
guilty of polygamy, a felony of the third degree, if he marries or cohabits with 
more than one spouse at a time in purported exercise of the right of plural 
marriage” (the Model Penal Code quoted in Feinberg 1986: 266). By contrast, 
bigamy is defined a as a mere misdemeanour. To Joel Feinberg (1986), this 
                                                
56 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2008: 1). 
57 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2000: 1). 
58 The Model Penal Code is a statutory text developed by the American Law Institute and published in 1962. The 
purpose of the Model Penal Code is to stimulate and assist legislatures in their continuous efforts to update and 
standardize the penal law of the United States of America. The current form of the Code was last updated in 1981. 
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“seems to imply the principle that a trivial crime becomes a serious one when it is 
openly committed or publicly flaunted by the perpetrators in what they claim to be 
an exercise of their rights” (ibid.). Feinberg suggests that the Model Penal Code’s 
articulation of polygamy as the more serious crime be understood from the 
perspective of moral legalism. From this perspective polygamy is a potential threat 
to the appearance of respectability and would weaken the moral restraints if it 
were allowed to assume an air of purported legitimacy, and this legitimacy went 
unchallenged. Severe criminal prohibition thus becomes necessary to protect 
“public morals” (ibid: 267). 
Regardless of how this restriction of what some claim to be their valid 
religious right is rationalised, however, it nevertheless exposes an aporia in the 
construction of the United States as a country in which religious freedom 
“flourishes.” The criminalisation creates a sovereign sphere in which individuals 
may be sentenced to up to five years in prison for engaging in religiously 
prescribed marital practices that challenge the heteronormative family structure. 
The United States thus depends on the legal restriction of religious freedom for the 
constitution of a hegemonic social norm. Paradoxically, however, the solution to 
the threat posed by polygamy to heteronormativity ends up undermining another 
value that is considered constitutive of the American identity: individual liberty. 
By restricting what some Americans claim as their inviolable religious right, the 
criminalisation of polygamy becomes an example of “a group right trumping an 
individual religious belief” (Fore 2002: 439). The criminalisation of polygamy 
thus also shows that religious rights rather than being “universal” are defined in a 
political and cultural context and granted by the sovereign power in its capacity to 
decide what counts legally and what does not count legally as a “universal right.” 
Mormons and other minority religions practicing polygamy thus constitute 
what Derrida calls a marginal area or internal limit in the legal structure of 
“religious freedom” in the United States (Derrida 1992b: 28). The criminalisation 
of the religious minorities that practice polygamy consequently signifies that a 
violence is at work in the American legal system. Moreover, this violence at the 
limit of religious freedom exposes the idiomatic quality of the Model Penal 
Code—its cultural, political and economic embeddedness. 
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Another excluded narrative that can be constructed to contest the 
construction of the American paragon of the present is the continued repression of 
Native Americans in American society. This narrative contests the construction of 
the “United States” as a static, ideologically pure unit controlled by the federal 
government by referring: 
 
 to the process by which white Europeans have been consolidating control over the 
continental domain (now recognized as the United States) in a war with several 
indigenous (“Indian”) nations. This grammar, within which we could have the 
“United States” in a different way – as violent process [sic.] rather than as a static, 
naturalized reality – would lead us to note that while the armed hostilities have all but 
ceased, there remains a system of economic exclusion which has the effect of 
maintaining a steady attrition rate among native Americans. The war goes on by 
other means, and the one-sidedness of the battle is still in evidence. For example, in 
the state of Utah, the life expectancy of the native American is only half that of the 
European descendant (Shapiro 1988: 95). 
 
The narrative thus challenges whether the war of the frontier ever truly finished by 
highlighting the continued troubles experienced by Native Americans. Although 
this critique might be perceived as a problem concerning ethnic rights rather than 
religious rights, the disciplining of the “barbaric” Amerindian also included forced 
conversion. Moreover, during the 19th century’s de facto Protestant establishment 
the conversion of Native Americans to Christianity was effectively systematised 
through the efforts of the federal government (Sullivan in Hackett, Silk & Hoover 
2000: 47). The continued repression of Native Americans thus also has a religious 
dimension. 
In the past two sections I have attempted to destabilise the homogenisation of 
the American identity by pointing to contradictory identities and narratives that have 
been excluded, marginalised and silenced by the IRF policy discourse in order to 
render the contingent state identity secure. One may say that I in doing so have 
inverted the position of the United States by showing that the country also can be 
constructed as the weaker part of the binary hierarchy “religious freedom”/“violations 
of religious freedom.” Having thus interrogated the limits of the American self-
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conception in the IRF policy discourse, I now move on to an interrogation of the 
boundaries of the discourse’s externalisation of religious violence to foreign states. 
 
The Externalisation of Religious Violence to Foreign States 
To examine the American IRF foreign policy discourse’s definition of a state that 
violates religious freedom, a so-called “persecuting regime,” we have to look no 
further than the IRFA’s sixth finding, which states that: “Though not confined to a 
particular region or regime, religious persecution is often particularly widespread, 
systematic, and heinous under totalitarian governments and in countries with 
militant, politicized religious majorities” (IRFA 1998: Section 2(a)(6)). The two 
factors considered most conducive for violations of religious freedom are thus: 
totalitarian or authoritarian governments and states in with “militant, politicized 
religious majorities.” “Totalitarian or authoritarian attempts to control religious 
belief or practice” is also listed as the most severe category in the executive 
summaries’ categorising system for foreign states mentioned in the first section of 
this chapter.59 In the Executive Summary to the 2001 State Department Report, the 
category is described as follows: 
 
 Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are defined by the high degree to which they 
seek to control thought and expression, especially dissent.  It is not uncommon for 
such regimes to regard religious groups as enemies of the state because of the content 
of the religion, the fact that the very practice of religion threatens the dominant 
ideology (often by diverting the loyalties of adherents toward an authority beyond the 
state), the ethnic character of the religious group, or a mixture of all three.  When one 
or more of these elements is present, the result often is the suppression of religion by 
the regime.60 
 
As we shall now see, however, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes not only 
facilitate religious discrimination in their attempt to control thought and 
expression; this control also leads repressed religious groups onto the path 
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60 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2002), 
Executive Summary to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 
 2001).  
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religiously motivated violence. The IRF policy discourse’s large focus on the 
threat posed by religious violence started in the reports after the September 11 
attacks of 2001. This is perhaps not that surprising, considering that the attacks 
were almost immediately labelled “Islamic terrorism.” In his introduction to the 
first State Department Report issued after the attacks, Ambassador John Hanford 
emphasises the importance of the attacks to IRF policy in the following way: 
 
 U.S. religious freedom policy is a means of fighting the war on terrorism. The events 
of September 11, 2001 have had significant implications for that policy. The attacks 
by Al Qaeda highlighted the reality that people can and do exploit religion for terrible 
purposes, in some cases manipulating and destroying other human beings as mere 
instruments in the process.61 
 
The IRFA is thus rearticulated as an instrument in the new global War on Terror. 
At the same time the violence is disassociated with “true” religion, since it is 
considered an “exploitation” of religion for “terrible purposes.” Moreover, 
religious terrorism is constructed as intrinsically linked to states that do not respect 
religious freedom. These states are constructed as both intentional and 
unintentional contributors to terrorism in several different ways: 
 
 All too often, countries that violate religious liberty also contribute to terrorism, 
intentionally or unintentionally. In some cases, those governments that are hostile to 
religious liberty have also been hospitable to terrorism. In other cases, nations have 
targeted religious believers, even under the guise of anti-terrorism campaigns, and 
driven some towards radicalism and violence.62 
 
The link between persecuting regimes and religiously motivated terrorism is 
further cemented by the externalisation of religion-based violence from countries 
in which religious freedom is respected. Writes Hanford: “Where governments 
protect religious freedom, and citizens value it as a social good, religious 
persecution and religion-based violence find no warrant.”63 Religion-based 
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62 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2003: 1). 
63 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2002: 2). 
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violence is thus viewed as a phenomenon that finds justification only in 
persecuting regimes. In this way, the differentiation of religiously motivated 
violence from the geographical category “religious freedom” is an indirect 
externalisation of this violence from the United States, in the sense that the United 
States constructed as the world’s leading paragon of “religious freedom.” 
  The IRF policy discourse also connects “militant, politicized religious 
majorities” with religious extremism and terrorism. In the introduction to the 2003 
State Department Report, for, example, Ambassador Hanford asserts: 
 
 The promise of religious freedom stands in stark, enduring contrast to the peril of 
religious extremism. Religious extremists cling desperately to the idea that religion 
demands the death of innocents and the destruction of liberty. We hold confidently to 
the idea that religious freedom respects the life of all and the cultivation of human 
dignity. While religious terrorism dictates violent intolerance, religious freedom 
encourages peaceful coexistence. What religious extremism demands as the iron rule 
of the state, religious freedom reserves for the sanctity of the individual conscience. 
Where religious terrorism defiles the sacred, religious freedom honors the sacred.64 
 
In the above quote, we may observe that the construction of “religious extremism” 
and “religious terrorism” draws on language normally associated with 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. By articulating “religious extremism” and 
“religious terrorism” in associative chains with “dictate” and “the iron rule of the 
state,” Hanford makes religious extremism and religious terrorism seem naturally 
connected with totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. At the same time, “the iron 
rule of the state” references the politicization of religion, which runs counter with 
the IRF policy discourse’s private conception of religion as a matter reserved to 
the “sanctity of the individual conscience.”65 If we further scrutinise the above 
quote, we see that, on a grander scale, “religious extremism” and “religious 
terrorism” are understood as phenomena directed directly against the inherent 
dignity, freedom and sacredness of the individual and thus the code of morals, law 
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65 The private conception of religion that we here see reflected in the IRF policy discourse’s conception of 
religious freedom originates in Protestant and Enlightenment theories of the relation between state and religion 
that also inspired the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. The clause prohibits the establishment of 
religion by Congress as follows: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” (First 
Amendment to the Bill of Rights (1789)). 
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and order the is inscribed as constitutive of the American identity. In “demanding 
the destruction of liberty,” “religious extremism” and “religious terrorism” are 
thus constructed as phenomena directed directly against everything the United 
States stands for. This construction is, of course, only further supported by the 
September 11 attacks. 
Before the September 11 attacks, the IRF policy discourse had mainly the 
character of an emancipatory discourse. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
introductions to the State Department Reports during this time were primarily 
concerned with the development of a theory of human rights to justify American 
foreign policy actions in response to the injustice of global religious persecution. 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, however, the focus is split between an 
emancipatory discourse and a security discourse. “Nations that respect religious 
freedom rarely pose a security threat to their neighbors,”66 writes Ambassador 
Hanford in 2004. This is not to say that the IRF policy discourse has not always 
been connected with national security—the connection present in the law’s 
creation of a Special Advisor on Religious Persecution for the National Security 
Council. National security was just not particularly prominent in the discourse 
before religious extremism and terrorism started being discursively associated 
with states that violate religious freedom. 
The security dimension of the IRF policy discourse is also articulated as a 
need to “protect what has been won” through the course of American history: 
“Our own historical record is admittedly far from perfect, yet that very history 
makes us all the more determined to protect what has been won.”67 While it is not 
entirely clear what Hanford is referring to here, we can assume he is referring to 
the United States’ history of religious persecution and its present state of fully 
realised religious freedom. Implied in Hanford’s statement we thus find the notion 
that in order to protect religious freedom in the United States, it is necessary to 
secure religious freedom in all other states. Consequently, the IRF policy 
discourse can be understood as a “civilising mission” that is justified by the 
need—or even duty—to civilise and educate foreign states in religious freedom to 
prevent a danger that would otherwise flourish. From this perspective, the IRF 
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67 Introduction to the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (U.S. Department of State 2003: 1). 
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policy discourse constructs world politics in such a way as to naturalise IRF policy 
as, partly, a defensive reaction to a hostile, dangerous and potentially violent 
political environment. Thus positioned as the endangered victim (as symbolised by 
the September 11 attacks), the “identity of the United States becomes part and 
parcel of the state’s global reach” (Campbell 1998: 134). 
 
Deconstructing the Dichotomy of “Inside”/“Outside” 
It should be clear by now that the IRF policy discourse’s construction of a 
geography of religious freedom serves to exclude the phenomena religious 
persecution and terrorism from the American identity by externalising them to 
foreign states. As we have already seen in the case of the American 
criminalisation of polygamy, however, restrictions on religious freedom is not 
simply a phenomenon that resides in the external realm. We might say the same of 
the threat posed by religious extremism, which the IRF policy also externalises to 
foreign states. Violent religious forces also threaten the United States from within. 
The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, for instance, was a terrorist act carried out 
by a Christian fundamentalist connected to Elohim City, a local Christian 
extremist group (Newman 2005: 101). Antiabortion violence is another more 
persistent example of religious terrorism in the United States. Executed by 
members of Christian extremist groups such as Army of God, the violent methods 
of these antiabortionist individuals include arson, bombings as well as murders of 
abortion doctors and abortion clinic staff members.68 
Moreover, in this age of “liquid modernity” characterised by flows and 
networks (Zygmunt Bauman in Beck 2006: 27), threats do not necessarily 
correspond to the category of the nation-state, which the IRF policy discourse 
relies on with its geography of religious freedom. If we consider the transnational 
terrorism of the al-Qaeda variety, we find that its operational methods deconstruct 
the binary of “inside”/”outside” that organises the IRF policy discourse. The al-
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Qaeda’s “active units and their ‘handlers’ are motivated neither by territory nor by 
the state, and they are not fighting for their own state” (ibid: 139). This challenges 
IRF policy discourse’s national outlook, such as its articulation of terrorism as the 
result of the repression of religious freedom in states with particularly 
authoritarian and totalitarian type governments. The al-Qaeda’s transnational 
network structure completely transgresses the territorial boundaries imposed by 
the geography of religious freedom. It therefore makes little sense to speak of the 
terrorist threat as coming from a distinct “inside” or “outside.” 
Given all these possible locations of violence and threats in an unfinished 
and chaotic world, the IRF policy discourse’s consistent location of them in the 
external realm must then be understood as serving a particular interpretative and 
political function (Campbell 1998: 63). Certainly, a very particular logic of 
representation is at work in the IRF policy discourse’s construction of the United 
States. This representation is dependent on a logic of exclusion that converts all the 
“differences, discontinuities, and conflicts that might be found within all places and 
times […] into an absolute difference between a domain of domestic society, 
understood as an identity, and a domain of anarchy, understood as at once ambiguous, 
indeterminate, and dangerous” (Richard K. Ashley quoted in ibid.). 
If we consider the hierarchic implications of the IRF policy discourse’s 
inscription of the American identity in the image of religious freedom, the location of 
religious persecution and terrorism in the external realm would thus seem to serve the 
particular political function of “hiding” the fact that the American sovereign domain 
is just as violent, ambiguous and indeterminable as the threatening “other” realm from 
which it is distinguished. In this way, the United States can emerge as a morally pure 
space endangered by a chaotic “outside.” This image is crucial for the constitution of 
the United States as the just global sovereign who acts out of moral obligation, not 
only in defence of persecuted religious individuals and minorities across the globe, 
but also to protect one of the most fundamental values of American society. 
 
A Blessing Sought to Share? 
The IRF policy discourse thus understands itself in multiple ways: it is an 
emancipatory discourse for the global victims of religious persecution as well a 
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necessary instrument for national security in the face of international terrorism. In 
consistency with the moral superiority code established by the direct identification 
between the United States and religious freedom, however, the IRF policy discourse 
is also constructed as an act of benevolence. In the introduction to the 2004 State 
Department Report, Ambassador John Hanford asserts: 
 
 In short, religious freedom is a hallmark of our nation’s history, and it is a blessing 
that we seek to share. “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” declared Thomas 
Jefferson in introducing the landmark Virginia Act for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, “and the rights hereby asserted are the natural rights of mankind.” Such 
natural rights are not confined to Americans, nor should they be.69 
 
Hanford thus thinks of the IRF policy discourse in terms of “sharing” a value that 
is constitutive of the American tradition as evidenced by the Virginia Act for 
Establishing Religious Freedom, which was proposed by Thomas Jefferson in 1779 
and adopted by the General Assembly in 1786. Since the Act was among the sources 
that inspired the Bill of Rights,70 we may observe that Hanford articulates it to 
signify and reproduce the mythical conception of religious freedom as eternally 
present in American history. The iconic quality this construction gives the American 
identity is, moreover, further supported by the articulation of religious freedom as “a 
blessing,” which further implies that the United States has been “blessed” with 
religious freedom. Hanford’s statement is thus also consistent with the Pledge of 
Allegiance’s construction of the United States as “one nation under God.”71 
Moreover, Hanford’s use of the modal verb “should” indicates that a sense of 
moral obligation and duty is connected to the IRF policy discourse. Things are not 
as they should be, and since the United States has been “blessed” with the 
knowledge and experience of religious freedom, it is morally obligated to address 
religious persecution on an international level, thus “sharing” its blessings like a 
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good Samaritan. Hanford thus glosses over the IRF policy discourse’s connection 
to violence and sovereignty by constructing the United States as the charitable 
global guardian of religious freedom who is leading the world by example. 
However, as this chapter has attempted to show, this “blessing” of religious 
freedom that the United States “seeks to share” is a fiction that is constituted by 
the exclusion of all contradictory and inconsistent elements in American history 
and present. 
 
The Mechanism of Domination 
This chapter has interrogated the binary opposition of “religious 
freedom”/“violations of religious freedom” that structures the oppositional 
discourse of the IRFA. In doing so, I have shown how this structure serves to 
establish a violent global hierarchy in favour of the United States. In other words, 
I have attempted to show how the use of binary hierarchies in oppositional 
discourses implies a mechanism of domination. I think the IRF policy discourse is 
an exemplary example of this mechanism at work because it actively inscribes the 
American state identity in the category “religious freedom,” while at the same 
time making the rest of the world’s states different from the United States by 
inscribing them in the category “violations of religious freedom.” By using this 
hierarchy binary hierarchy as the organising principle for difference, all foreign 
states are thus subordinated to the United States in the same way that “violations 
of religious freedom” is subordinated to “religious freedom.” Religious freedom 
thus becomes associated with the moral authority of the United States, while 
violations of religious freedom become associated with the moral depravity of the 
rest of the world. In this capacity, I think the IRF policy discourse is an exemplary 
example of how binary structures perpetuate discourses and practices of 
domination (Newman 2005: 86). 
We might say that the IRF foreign policy discourse succumbs to the 
temptation of otherness in its attempt to secure a stable, cohesive state identity. 
The object the IRF policy discourse opposes—violations of religious freedom—is 
made categorically different or “other” from the United States. The dichotomy of 
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“religious freedom”/“violations of religious freedom” is not fixed by any intrinsic 
characteristics of states, however; a state can move from the status of a 
persecuting regime to the status of having realised “religious freedom” by 
adopting the democratic principles that allow its citizens the freedom “to study, 
believe, observe, and freely practice the religious faith of their choice” (IRFA 
1998: Section 2(4)). The possibility of movement between the categories 
“religious freedom” and “violations of religious freedom” presupposes that all 
states are seen as having the same potential and “capacities (although unfulfilled) 
as the higher standard against which they are judged” (Campbell 1998: 103). 
However, the inscription of identity/difference into the binary hierarchy of 
“religious freedom”/“violations of religious freedom” also carries with it the 
implication of colonialism. Campbell explains: 
 
 This in-principle postulate of identity leads to the practice of colonialism as the 
values and figuration of the self are projected onto the equal but yet culturally blank 
other. […] Whenever these distinctions are called into service to fix ambiguity and 
judge diversity, they do so in terms of an unrequited egocentrism which given the 
history of exploration and interpretation, is concomitant with Eurocentrism and what 
Derrida termed the “metaphysics of presence.” As Todorov notes, each of the 
orientations towards otherness begins with “the identification of our own values in 
general, of our I with the universe”” (Campbell 1998: 103). 
 
That diversity is judged against the American paragon can be detected in the IRF 
policy discourse’s affirmation of the American rights tradition, which the previous 
chapter found to be universalised in the IRFA.72 Moreover, the first section of this 
chapter showed how the IRF policy discourse sovereignly displays the power to 
define and distinguish “religions” from “cults” or “sects.” It would thus appear, 
that the standards against which a foreign state is judged (as well as the nature of 
the punishment) are defined exclusively by and in the image of the United States 
itself. This egocentrism would thus have some extent of colonial implications for 
states that receive the CPC designation and (if not waived) an economic sanction. 
                                                
72 See chapter 2, section: “Religious Freedom: The “First Freedom” of Human Rights?” 
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We thus see that the IRFA grants the United States the sovereign power to 
both define and act on violations of religious freedom in any state on a global 
level, whilst at the same time exempting all Presidential actions from the scrutiny 
and consequence of any law. Since law cannot be negotiated with, foreign 
countries that are sanctioned as a consequence of being designated CPC’s have no 
agency left but subservience, if not resignation to their sentences. In that sense, the 
IRFA can be constructed as a unilateral attempt to force American standards on 
religion and religious freedom on foreign states with the threat of economic 
punishment. 
 In the examination of the binary structure organising the IRF policy discourse, 
I have thus detected the inherent idea that the United States is ideologically superior 
in comparison to all non-American peoples and cultures—at least in the area of 
religious freedom. I have also shown how this positional superiority is underscored by 
the sovereign exclusion of the United States from the sphere of the IRFA and any 
other law. In doing so, I have argued that the IRF policy discourse’s representation 
practices thus serve to place the United States in a hierarchic relationship with the rest 
of the world in which it never risks losing the relative upper hand. By showing the 
connection between sovereignty and the originary violence at the foundation of all 
laws and institutions, I have, moreover, shown that the sovereign position of the 
United States is tainted by a violence lacking in any kind of anterior legitimacy. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
The Violence at the Foundation of the IRFA 
The aim of this thesis has been to expose the link between the American IRF 
policy discourse and violence, sovereignty and dominance. I tried to contain this 
aim in the two-part question I asked in the problem definition in the introduction. 
Before attempting an answer, let us refresh the question: 
 
What violence at the foundation of the IRF policy discourse compromises its 
authority, and how does the IRF policy discourse’s binary structure facilitate 
American domination in relation to religious freedom? 
 
To answer the first part of the question, I interrogated the foundations of the IRF 
policy discourse in order to expose its complicity with unfounded violence. In this 
interrogative process I detected a problematic related to the discourse’s 
simultaneous foundation in the American tradition and international human rights 
standards. What I found was that the IRFA, rather than being a cohesive 
articulation of international human rights standards, actually rearticulates the 
American tradition within the context of international human rights. This 
rearticulation tries to universalise religious freedom as the “first freedom” of 
human rights, just as it is the “first freedom” of the Bill of Rights. I found this 
rearticulation to be the greatest problem to the global legitimacy of the IRF policy 
discourse, primarily because of the inconsistency in the IRF policy discourse’s 
claim to be founded in a tradition that it clearly differs from structurally. Although 
the IRF policy discourse claims that the two traditions are “mutually supportive,” I 
have thus found that the discourse violates the authority of international human 
rights standards by introducing an unprecedented interpretation of human rights 
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that so particularly favours religious freedom on the international stage. The 
violence at the foundation of the IRF policy discourse is thus a discursive violence 
that Americanises the international human rights discourse. 
This violence at the foundation of the IRF policy discourse presents a 
problem to the economic sanctions authorised by the IRFA. The violent, unilateral 
discursive act at foundation of the law is also represented in its means in the sense 
that its unilateral sanctions lack the legitimacy secured by backing from 
international organisations such as the United Nations. 
 
The Structure of American Domination 
The binary hierarchy of “religious freedom”/“violations of religious freedom” is 
the central organising principle for the constitution of identity/difference in the 
IRF policy discourse. As we saw in the analysis of the discourse’s construction of 
the American state identity, this rigid either/or structure swallows up all 
distinctions in favour of the United States. Everything that does not fit the 
straightjacket of the category “religious freedom” is excluded from the American 
identity and externalised to the foreign realm. The IRF policy discourse does offer 
a few scattered admissions on a less than perfect past in terms of religious 
freedom, but these admissions nevertheless exist unproblematically side by side 
with a continuous emphasis on the constitutive role of religious freedom in 
American history and society. 
This exclusionary identity practice is especially significant if we consider 
the context in which it appears: an oppositional foreign policy discourse based on 
a national law and the universality of human rights. The imposition of the IRFA 
created a sovereign sphere in which the United States possesses the sovereign 
power to define and act on matters pertaining to violations of religious freedom in 
all states. In addition, the United States uses this sovereign power to 
simultaneously place itself outside the law’s sovereign sphere—outside the reach 
of law. At the same time, the violent practices that are externalised to foreign 
states in the constitution of the American identity also constitute the acts that are 
criminalised by the law. It would thus seem that the exclusionary identity practice 
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serves the political function of legitimising the United States’ sovereign power by 
glossing over any connection with that which it opposes. 
With the inscription of the United States in the image of “religious 
freedom” and, potentially, the rest of the world in the figure “violations of 
religious freedom,” the IRF policy discourse thus subordinates the world to the 
United States in the same way that “violations of religious freedom” is 
subordinated to “religious freedom.” We thus see how this binary hierarchy forms 
the foundation for United States sovereignty in the IRF policy discourse and 
contributes to the perpetuation of American discourses and practices of 
domination in the sense that it subordinates all states equated with violations of 
religious freedom to the United States. 
Moreover, the externalisation of violations of religious freedom and 
religious violence from the United States creates the ideal against which the all 
other states are judged in the IRF policy discourse. The possibility of moving from 
the weaker pole of the binary hierarchy to the strong pole entails a movement from 
“other” to “self.” This is, for example, seen in the country category “stigmatization 
of certain religions by wrongfully associating them with dangerous “cults” or 
“sects,” where the move from moral inferiority entails adopting an American 
conception of acceptable religious practices and religion. In doing so, we might 
say that the United States succumbs to the temptation of otherness by locking the 
world in a position of subservience and moral inferiority where the possibility of 
becoming morally sound to an extent also entails becoming more “American.” In 
that sense, this thesis’ analysis of the link between the IRF policy discourse and 
violence, sovereignty and domination has served to question whether religious 
freedom really is a blessing that the United States seeks to share. 
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Perspective 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has focused on the connection between the IRFA, sovereignty and 
unfounded violence as well as the implications of dominance and colonialism in 
the binary structure organising the IRF policy discourse’s construction of the 
United States against the rest of the world. In the analysis, however, foreign states 
were only represented in general categories such as “authoritarian” and 
“totalitarian governments.” The problematisation of the State Department Reports’ 
categorisation of individual states would add another perspective to the credibility 
and thus authority of the IRF policy discourse. 
If we take the case of Egypt, for example, it is clear that the categorisation 
of the country is less severe than evidence suggests it could be. Egypt is only 
categorised as having a problem with “state neglect of the problem of 
discrimination against, or persecution of, minority or non-approved religions,” 
which is defined as follows: “In some countries, governments have laws or 
policies to discourage religious discrimination and persecution but fail to act with 
sufficient consistency and vigor against violations of religious freedom by 
nongovernmental entities or local law enforcement officials.”73 However, evidence 
suggests that Egypt might also be constructed to fit the category “totalitarian or 
authoritarian attempts to control religious freedom and belief.” For example, the 
IRF Reports on Egypt track the gradual success of the Egyptian government’s 
efforts to bring all unauthorised mosques under its control in “an effort to combat 
Islamic extremists.”74 In 1999, the State Department Report thus reports that: “Of 
the country’s approximately 70,000 mosques, nearly half remain unlicensed and 
operate outside the control of government authorities.”75 In 2008, the Report notes 
                                                
73 Executive Summary to Annual International Religious Freedom Report (U.S. Department of State 2001). 
74 Annual International Religious Freedom Report on Egypt (U.S. Department of State 1999: 1). 
75 Ibid. 
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that only 5,000 mosques out of 100,006 remain unsupervised.76 This development 
could certainly be constructed as a near-successful totalitarian attempt to control 
religion under the guise of fighting extremists—especially in the light of the 
severe discrimination of Shi’a Muslims and Baha’is that the Reports also note. 
Moreover, as the Reports also note, only three religions are recognised officially 
in Egypt, and especially unrecognised Muslim minorities are discriminated against 
with arbitrary arrests for “insulting Islam,” a violation of Article 98(F) of the 
Penal Code.77 From this example we thus see that the categorisation of countries in 
the IRF policy discourse is largely a question of interpretation, a factor gravely 
contesting the credibility of the IRF policy discourse’s methods and analyses. 
Another interesting perspective could be to take note of how CPC 
designations are affected by American lead military interventions, for example, in 
connection with the War on Terror, which chapter 3 showed left a clear security 
imprint on the IRF policy discourse. Here, it would be especially interesting to 
note how both Afghanistan and Iraq were taken off the State Department’s CPC 
list after the United States had successfully imposed new, democratically elected 
governments in these states. Iraq, for example, had been on the CPC list from 
1999-2003 but was officially taken off the list in 2005 after the country’s “first 
free election” in January that same year.78 The reason Iraq was not on the list in 
2004 is that no IRF record exists for Iraq in the interim year between the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime by the “U.S.-lead Coalition in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom on April 9, 2003”79 and the January election in 2005. 
Iraq simply does not figure in the 2004 State Department Report on IRF.80 
However quick Iraq’s removal from the CPC list was after 2005’s “free election,” 
I find it interesting that it is coherent with the IRF policy discourse’s connection 
between authoritarian states and religious violence as well as its disassociation 
between “free democratic states” and violations of religious freedom. It would 
thus seem that the binary logic governing the IRF policy discourse supports the 
construction of the Iraq War as a success in terms of securing a greater degree of 
                                                
76 Annual International Religious Freedom Report on Egypt (U.S. Department of State 2008: 2). 
77 Annual International Religious Freedom Report on Egypt (U.S. Department of State 2001: 4). 
78 Annual International Religious Freedom Report on Iraq (U.S. Department of State 2005: 1). 
79 Annual International Religious Freedom Report on Iraq (U.S. Department of State 2003: 1). 
80 Annual International Religious Freedom Report on the Near East and North Africa (U.S. Department of State 
2004). 
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religious freedom in the country by installing “democracy.” On the other hand, the 
independent Commission does seem to be serving its job as a watchdog by 
insisting on the immediate re-designation of Iraq as a CPC due to continued 
problems with religious violence and persecution. 
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Resumé 
 
 
 
 
Dette speciale tager udgangspunkt i den amerikanske udenrigspolitiske diskurs, 
der er autoriseret af den amerikanske lov International Religious Freedom Act af 
1998 (IRFA). IRFA er en lov der modsætter sig overtrædelser af religiøs frihed på 
internationalt plan. Den ti år gamle lov er et resultat af særligt kristne gruppers 
lobbyisme i Washington for at få religiøs frihed inkorporeret i amerikansk 
udenrigspolitik for at bedre vilkårene for udenlandske ofre for religiøs forfølgelse i 
udenlandske stater. IRFA kræver, at USA iværksætter unilaterale sanktioner mod 
stater, hvis handlinger bliver kategoriseret som særligt strenge overtrædelser af 
religiøs frihed. 
 
Målet med specialet er at problematisere IRFA diskursen som en 
oppositionspolitisk menneskerettighedsdiskurs ved at fremhæve dens 
sammenhæng med vold, suverænitet og dominans. Denne problematisering 
foretages gennem to analytiske greb: for det første gennem en derridiansk 
dekonstruktion af lovens autoritet, og for det andet gennem en destabilisering af 
den binære logik, der strukturerer IRFA diskursens konstruktion af det 
internationale samfund. 
 
Det første skridt, som bygger på Jacques Derridas kritik af lov og autoritet, der 
viser, at alle institutioner er funderet på illegitim vold. Denne indsigt bruges til at 
vise, hvordan IRFA er funderet på en voldelig, illegitim diskursiv handling. Som 
udenrigspolitisk lov hævder IRFA at være autoriseret af det internationale 
menneskerettighedsregime. Denne påstand viser sig dog at være i modstrid med 
IRFA diskursens fortolkning af menneskerettigheder. Fortolkningen reartikulerer 
religiøs frihed som fundamentet for alle menneskerettigheder og bryder dermed 
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med FN’s Generalforsamlings opfattelse af menneskerettigheder som udelelige og 
ligeværdige. IRFA diskursens fortolkning af menneskerettigheder kan dog ses i 
lyset af den amerikanske rettighedstradition, hvor religiøs frihed er den ”første 
frihed” sikret i USA’s Forfatning. Mens dette måske gør IRFA diskursens 
fortolkning legitim i en amerikansk kontekst, gør det dog den imidlertid ikke 
legitim på det internationale plan, den udsiges i. Som sådan anerkender 
fortolkningen ikke FN’s Generalforsamlings autoritet men skaber en ny lov, som 
strider mod FN’s menneskerettighedsprincipper og dermed lægger sig i kamp med 
den internationale opfattelse af menneskerettigheder. IRFA har således et 
legitimitetsproblem, der problematiserer de udenrigspolitiske handlinger, loven 
autoriserer.  
 
Det andet analytiske skridt undersøger det binære hierarki, der strukturerer IRFA 
diskursens verdensopfattelse, og hvordan dette hierarki viderefører 
dominansdiskurser og -praksisser. Et af IRFA diskursens mest iøjnefaldende træk 
er dens kontinuerlige fokus på at konstruere USA i overensstemmelse med religiøs 
frihed og i modsætning til overtrædelser af religiøs frihed. Ved at destabilisere 
denne binære struktur viser specialet, hvordan IRFA diskursen afhænger af 
eksklusion for at skabe et ensartet billede af USA som et ophøjet eksempel på 
religiøs frihed. Samtidig eksternaliserer IRFA diskursen overtrædelser af religiøs 
frihed samt religiøs vold såsom terrorisme til udenlandske stater. Denne inddeling 
af verden til USA’s fordel er med til at fastlåse udenlandske stater i en underdanig 
position. Det binære hierarki, som IRFA diskursen etablerer til USA’s fordel 
understøttes tilmed af IRFA, idet den som lov skaber en suveræn sfære og tildeler 
USA den suveræne magt til at definere og dømme alle udenlandske stater i forhold 
til egne kriterier for religiøs frihed. Dermed understøtter IRFA og IRFA 
diskursens binære struktur hinanden i en konstruktion af verden, hvor udenlandske 
stater straffes og dømmes ud fra amerikanske kriterier, alt imens USA som den 
suveræne magt bruger denne magt til at stille sig udenfor loven. 
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